 s the MP for Dagenham on the
East side of London one of the most wretched experiences
arising out of the local election campaigns – one of
manys – was seeing the cover of the May/June
edition of ‘Progress – Labour’s
Progressive Magazine’. The top banner headline
of the edition established the leadership’s
post rationalisation for the election defeats – often
described as the narrative. Put simply ‘we
lost New Labour votes’ was the conclusion
drawn by Tony Blair.
This was followed by the predictable interventions
by Mandelson, Milburn and the like all of whom
defined the results in a highly specific way. The
only losses were New Labour losses. The only solutions,
ceteris parabus, are New Labour solutions. We must
therefore reform further along New Labour lines;
to offer up the usual triangulations; to placate
the right wing press and push for more clamp downs;
to signal even more authoritarian party reforms;
to promote more ultras and carry on separating
ourselves from the day to day life experiences
of millions of people. Simplistic New Labour solutions
are provided, refracted through the mindset of
middle England, increasingly at odds with the empirical
realities of modern Britain
The BNP and the Local Elections
The BNP was one of the major winners in the 2006
local elections according to new data supplied
by the anti-fascist group Searchlight. In the wards
it contested its share of the vote rose by approximately
3% compared to 2003 and 2004. It has broken out
of its West Yorkshire and East Lancashire strongholds,
performing strongly across the West Midlands, London
and Essex. Even in Sussex, Hampshire and Wiltshire,
they polled over 15% of the vote in several wards
and polled over 14% in the South East overall.
In 13 authorities, where the BNP fielded five
or more candidates, the party won over 20% of the
vote where it entered the contest. In Barking and
Dagenham they polled on average 40.3% in the seven
wards where they stood. In Sandwell they averaged
33% for their nine candidates. This year they stood
full slates in Birmingham, Kirklees and Sunderland
and polled 11.3%, 18.4% and 15% respectively.
The Labour hierarchy see the BNP as a localised
phenomena. During the election campaign the Labour
Minister Andy Burnham described the BNP as a ‘protest
vote in a few pockets of the country’. In
his region of the North West they averaged 21.5%
in the wards they contested. In Yorkshire and Humberside
they averaged 20%, in the West Midlands 21.2%,
and in the Eastern region the figure was 29.6%.
It is the Labour Party that has most to loose
from the BNP. Of the 33 BNP councillors elected,
28 seats were either won from Labour or in places
where Labour is the main challenger. Of the BNP’s
next 50 strongest performances, Labour won 36.
Research for the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust
found that most BNP supporters were skilled or
semi-skilled workers – 72.7% were found in
social groups C2, D and E – exactly the constituency
from which Labour has traditionally drawn support.
New Labour, Middle England, Race, Class and the
BNP
The common criticism of New Labour from the left
is a fairly straightforward one: that it is part
of the neo-liberal right and thus a product of
this ideology. An alternative approach is not to
see it as the product of a body of ideas as such.
Rather to see it as singularly driven by the imperatives
of power retention. Its policy agenda is crafted
out of a rigorous analysis of the preferences and
the prejudices of those voters who matter – swing
voters in marginal seats – rather than traditions
of thoughts or ideologies. In short, in order to
reproduce the power of this political elite it
must dominate middle England.
Ideas are only introduced so as to render intelligible
this exercise in abstract political positioning – polling
determines policy. This was aided by the contributions
of a number of academics who sought to legitimise
this political repositioning with reference to
supposed revolutions in economic and social relations.
Issues of inequality, class and power were seen
to be withering away as technological revolutions
within the context of globalisation meant that
the primary role of the state was to provide ‘education,
education, education’ to enable individual
self-actualisation in the new epoch – the
classless, knowledge economy of New Labour.
Yet the fundamental dilemma for New Labour is
the growing rupture between, on the one hand, the
stylised view of modernity upon which it constructs
its policy and, on the other, the empirical realities
of modern Britain and the day to day realities
of class, race and inequality.
On the basis of empirical changes over the last
ten years and the best projections for the future,
we are witnessing an ever clearer polarisation
within the labour market and society – the
hour glass economy. On the one hand, a primary
labour market- or the knowledge based economy – covering
about 21% of jobs. On the other hand an expanding
secondary labour market where the largest growth
is occurring – in service related elementary
occupations, administrative and clerical occupations,
sales occupations, caring, personal service jobs
and the like. New Labour’s political strategy
has been driven by the middle England dynamics
at work at the top of this hour glass – the
inference being that those who occupy the bottom
half will always stick with Labour as they have
no where else to go. As such, for specific positioning
purposes it constructed a model of the world which
rendered the latter – the working class – invisible
and downgraded the needs of their communities.
When we even acknowledge the existence of a working
class it tends to be demonised – for example
in debate around crime and anti-social behaviour.
Simultaneously, however, through its approach
to flexible labour markets and migration it has
ensured that the material conditions experienced
by many working class people are in decline be
it in relation to terms and conditions of employment,
housing pressures or the consumption of public
services. Even against a benign economic backdrop
this creates the material conditions for the emergence
of the far right.
Migration and Class in Urban Areas
The gearing of the electoral system ensures that
all political parties have to camp out in middle
England. Yet the dynamics at work in urban areas
outside of these tight confines are arguably creating
pressures that urgently demand an alternative policy
response to the spin and triangulations dominant
in Westminster political debate.
Take for example, the situation in London. According
to ONS figures for the period 1992-2003, the annual
inflows of legal international migrants into London
more than doubled from under 100,000 to roughly
200,000 per year. We can assume that a large part
of those who are working illegally are also resident
in the capital. The Government has assumed that
these number up to 570,000, namely people who overstay,
illegal entrants, failed asylum seekers and the
like. This figure does not include dependants.
This should be considered alongside the effect
of A8 European migration. The Home Office predicted
5-13,000 A8 migrants a year. In reality the first
18 months saw 293,000 registered for work. The
self employed do not register neither do students,
dependants and those who are illegal. We do not
have reliable total figures but the numbers could
well approach three quarters of a million, many
of whom will be in London.
In short, the dynamic at work in terms of population
flows into London is extraordinary, but remains
unquantifiable in terms of real levels of migration,
economic activity and thus the real demography
of the city.
These movements occur off the radar of politicians
and public policy makers. The communities that
actively attempt to deal with these movements are
the least equipped to do so as they are the poorest
yet they also provide the magnet of low cost housing.
These communities are disenfranchised because of
the political imperatives of middle England yet
maintain the worst health and education inequalities
and legacies of under-investment and structural
inequality. Yet these communities compete at the
bottom of the hour glass in a race to the bottom
of the labour market.
The incremental investment strategies deployed
by the State cannot even begin to deal with the
dynamics at work in many parts of urban Britain.
Policy is based on out of date census data that
disguises more than it exposes because of the extraordinary
movements in people especially over the last couple
of years. Hundreds of thousands of families do
not show up on any official data yet are having
profound effects in terms of labour markets and
public services. Moreover the communities within
which they live suffer from long term structural
neglect.
For many in communities such as Dagenham their
social wage is in steep decline as population growth
exceeds public service refinancing and wage rates
decline. Every issue of resource allocation is
thereby seen through the prism of race. The policy
solutions – for example building council
housing- are out of favour as they do not chime
with the preferences of middle England. In turn,
the prejudices of middle England mean we have to
triangulate around the lives of those most in need
of a Labour Government be they migrants or indigenous
working classes.
The Government remains mute on these issues which
in turn ensures that many in urban Britain believe
the Government is out of touch. The extreme example
to date is in Dagenham- the lowest cost housing
market in Greater London; the perfect storm for
the far right. Yet these issues remain generic
to urban Britain. The real danger is that this
policy mix will promote real tensions in an economic
downturn.
Jon Cruddas is Labour MP for Dagenham |
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