he enactment of the Human Rights Act on 2nd October has been
celebrated at the left/liberal end of the political spectrum
as the biggest change in constitutional law in 300 years.
For
the first time, we are told, individuals will benefit from
the enforcement of a wide range of basic rights in the domestic
courts. Public authorities and those exercising public functions
- including employers - will be obliged to respect the rights
laid down in the European Convention on Human Rights. Even Acts
of Parliament will have to be interpreted in a way that establishes
compatibility with human rights requirements. In the event that
a court felt that a particular statute conflicted with the new
standards of rights, it might declare the law to be incompatible
with the convention. Parliament will then have a fast track
procedure by which such laws could be amended.
The Act has not pleased the ideologues of the right. They
see it as compromising the principle of the sovereignty of
parliament: the raising up above traditional British civil
standards of legal principles forged by the constitutional
revolutions of Europe and the Americas. Furthermore, it will
mean a field day for judges, seizing new powers for themselves
to make radical changes to the law, and upsetting the age-old
balance of power between the legislature and judiciary.
The official new Labour government line on all this is ambiguous.
On the one hand ministers have enjoyed congratulations for
the production of one new piece of legislation which cannot
easily be presented as another disappointing Tory compromise.
On the other hand they have been anxious to reassure all those
who need reassuring that the Act is merely a tidying up measure.
The Act does nothing new they opine; it simply allows
more direct access to rights which have been available to
UK residents since the Convention was signed up to in 1950.
The necessity of having to proceed to the Strasbourg-based
European Court of Human Rights in each and every case has
been circumvented by the new powers granted to the judges
in the UK jurisdiction to consider complaints of human rights
violations directly.
On this, moderate, interpretation of the effects of the Act,
Labour is probably correct. The untrammelled sovereignty of
the UK parliament has been much eroded during the decades
since the second world war. An increasingly complex international
legal regime requires governments and parliaments alike to
bend to world trade regulations, the European Union's competencies,
and, more recently the de-centralising shifts towards assemblies
and parliaments in different parts of the UK. The Human Rights
Act is in many ways little more than a long-overdue rationalisation
of complicated procedures which will produce all round benefits
by way of transparency and greater simplicity.
But enthusiasm for Constitutional tidiness is not the reason
why some genuine radicals have committed themselves to the
success of the Act, body and soul. Charter 88 - the best known
constitutional reform campaign group - has long proclaimed
the need for a human rights act as a key instrument in creating
what it calls 'a culture of citizenship'. Liberty - the former
National Council for Civil Liberties - has argued that there
is intrinsic value in a legal order which maintains the rights
of individuals against the power of the state, irrespective
of its consequences for administrative efficiency. For these,
and other, campaigning groups, the emergence of a system based
on the inviolable character of human rights is a part of the
long, slow British revolution towards a modern political democracy.
These are not views you would expect Home Secretary Jack
Straw to feel comfortable with. His reputation as a cautious
conservative in social and political matters is well illustrated
in his response to pressures for reform and liberalisation
across a wide range of issues. The extent of his trepidation
with regard to the potentially radical impact of a new human
rights culture was shown very clearly in a public lecture
entitled 'Human Rights and Personal Responsibility' given
to an audience in St Paul's Cathedral on the day of enactment
of the new legislation.
Straw's theme was that the battle for human rights should
not develop merely as the ascendancy of the individual over
the state. The original European Convention was framed during
a period when the public mind was much exercised by the recent
(and then current) evidence of state inhumanity and contempt
for the lives and liberties of citizens. With the shadow of
Nazi and state communist repression cast over the deliberations
of the international community, the Convention became a means
- feeble perhaps, but better than nothing - of asserting a
right to life, protection from inhuman and degrading treatment,
liberty and respect for privacy as the cornerstone of the
community of democratic nations.
There is too much in the activities of modern democratic
countries which still gives rise to concerns about violations
of fundamental rights, be it state repression or inhuman treatment,
as in the case of the UK. This is illustrated in the context
of government policy in Northern Ireland or with regard to
refugees and asylum seekers. But the logic of a Convention
which has its foundations in a legal order is that the arguments
available to a victim of torture, or a family torn asunder
by immigration policies, are also there for the use of a highly
paid professional anxious to escape the shackles of a contract
unwisely entered into, or a litigant who wishes to argue that
aspects of the tax system are burdensome and oppressive. Much
has been made of Cherie Booth's initiative in establishing
a set of chambers exclusively for human rights barristers,
but the truth is that if the Human Rights Act does help sustain
'fat cat lawyers' it is more likely to be because their clients
are George Michael, or feudal-minded landowners, than the
truly down-trodden and oppressed.
Straw argues that the emergence of a new world of human rights
must entail more than a further tilt of the scales toward
individualism and against collective responsibility. 'No man
is an island', he quoted on several occasions to his St Paul's
audience, gesturing to the statue of John Donne behind him
in the transepts, and the socialists amongst them would have
been hard put not to agree. Indeed, a concept of human rights
itself is only possible because of an act of the collective
imagination, raised to the level of a cultural and political
reflex, by the actions of society on individuals. Straw's
question is one worth asking. How do we prevent a culture
of human rights from degenerating into a squabble about selfish
individualism, backed by the force of the law?
Unfortunately, Straw's answer - which unites both new and
old Labour's concepts of the prerogatives of power - is disappointing.
Basically, he says, we leave it to the state. It is the state
which will balance out excessive individualism with policies
that assert the primacy of marriage, the family, and an emphasis
on old-fashioned 'civics' as a core element in the educational
system. In short, all those social and state institutions
most under assault by the forces of modernising individualism
are to be relied upon to raise the standard of community and
collective responsibility.
Well don't bet on it. It will take more than government tweeking
of its tax and social security policies, and the imposition
of yet more burdens on the teaching profession, to rescue
the situation. What is needed in fact is a reconceptualisation
of human rights in the period ahead, not as the terrain of
legal disputation, but as a gut response emerging from the
fighting organisations of civil society. What will ultimately
be more important for the fate of our society as a place where
basic human values are sustained is not what goes on in the
courts (though that has a part to play), but the ways in which
the press and media promote these ideals. How these values
are tackled in the cultural and artistic output of wider society
and how the religious faiths proclaim their scope to their
communities of believers will also be vital. The real test
will be how the trade unions take up battles on behalf of
groups of workers and how political parties (as opposed to
parliamentary factions) educate their activists. Finally,
the scope available within the economy for forms of productive
activity that are rooted in cooperation and solidarity, rather
than individualism and competition will be fundamental to
a judgement of the social benefits of the Act.
The struggle for human rights is too important to leave to
the judges, the politicians, or indeed any one faction of
society. Rights available through the law courts are too often
available only to relatively wealthy people with access to
the top QCs and all the other resources needed to mount a
legal battle. Nor will a human rights culture flourish as
a politician's programme to support the family or other good
causes. Jack Straw's real dilemma is that it will probably
take something like good, old-fashioned class struggle to
ensure that the values of a decent and humane society triumph
over selfish individualism.
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