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 espite an assertion to the contrary democracy is fragile.
Its fragility is also a strength in as much as it forces
us
to come to its defence. 'Rethinking democracy.' the conference
organised by Labour Reform and Chartist was intended
to do just that. The question we were asked to consider 'does
democracy need political parties?' has a simple answer - yes.
In the light of the ever greater centralisation of New Labour
and where the phrases 'stitch up' and 'backroom deals' are
becoming common currency I posed a further question - 'do
political parties need democracy?' It too demands the answer
- yes.
Both of these questions are prompted by the political circumstances
in which we now find ourselves, post cold war, specifically
the so-called end of ideology and the triumph of economic
and political liberalism. These assertions lie at the heart
of Fukuyama's notorious 'end of history' essay along with
his contention that a 'remarkable consensus has developed
in the world concerning the legitimacy and viability of liberal
democracy'. His essay provided succour and comfort to America,
which, post Vietnam and with economic rivalries from the East
had suffered a loss of confidence in its economic and defence
prowess. Now the supremacy of Western values was again hegemonic,
and politicians have mutated into technocrats asking only
'how' and not 'why'.
Acceptance of the end of history thesis, globalisation and
the 'Washington free market consensus' was apparent in Tony
Blair's 1999 Labour conference speech: "Global finance and
communications and media. Electronic commerce. The internet.
The science of genetics. Every year a new revolution scattering
in its wake, security and ways of living for millions of people.
These are the forces of change driving the future. They wait
for no-one and no nation. The challenge is how. The answer
is people".
These sentiments are those of a pragmatism which has political
outcomes determined by the experts who make up government
task forces. It is predicated on the belief that those tensions
between competing economic systems have supposedly been eradicated.
And it is the language of the techno-politician accepting
the world as it is. Yet tensions have not been taken out of
the system. They exist between liberalism and democracy itself,
namely between liberal individual rights, and democratic concerns
with collective action and public accountability. Furthermore,
there is more than one form of government, which can be comprehended
under the term "democracy".
New Labour gives all the appearance of suffering from a crisis
of identity. It knows it is no longer socialist. The discrediting
of socialist ideology, combined with the perceived failings
of nationalisation, specifically in relation to efficiency,
contributed to Labour's transition from a party concerned
with the collective to one based on individualism. But it
is not sure whether or not it is truly Social Democrat. Premier
Blair looks to Liberal figures of the past for inspiration,
while his close confidant Peter Mandelson recently asserted
that pure representative democracy was coming to an end. Plebiscites,
it would seem, are to be preferred to elections and the right
of the people through Parliament to hold the political elite
to account. Despite its defects, representative democracy
is infinitely superior to a form of voting that can be manipulated,
not to enhance democracy but to destroy it.
Fortunately only Mr. Mandelson believes in the end of 'representative
democracy'. But within the party itself there is a sense that
democratic impulses are stifled. A presentation to Labour's
National Executive Committee members in October this year
- dubbed 'New Democracy' - dealt with party structures. The
rhetoric may be of greater democracy, with an element of policy
formation given to members of regional policy forums, but
the reality is that the executive is dominant. According to
an NEC member who attended the presentation the intention
was clear - activists were not welcome, passive supporters
on the other hand were to be encouraged.
This is further proof of the increasing Americanisation of
politics. It is in line with the personalisation of political
issues where the plebiscitary dimension of politics reduces
the role of party organisation. We saw it in the run up to
the 1997 general election when the manifesto (without amendment)
was put to a vote of the membership. And we saw it when Clause
IV of Labour's constitution, with its ideological commitment
to public ownership, was dropped. Both plebiscites gave the
leadership overwhelming support, although this was hardly
surprising given the timing. The election was only months
away and self-discipline at all levels of the party was total.
However, while plebiscites may appear seductive they are essentially
undemocratic, as they become instruments of executive manipulation
rather than popular sovereignty. They are part and parcel
of an organisation which has weakened party structures, an
essential feature of the centrality of the leader.
Americanisation is not new and has long been a term of derision
on the left, but the personal chemistry between Bill Clinton
and Tony Blair has deepened the special relationship. The
New Democrats begat New Labour. Thus the British and American
political systems give every appearance of converging. The
most obvious - and commented upon - similarity emerging between
the two countries is in the increasing taste for strong leadership
of a 'presidential type' untrammelled by any political constraints,
other than the requirement to secure re-election every four
or five years. Through a synthesis of media and organisation
the party in 1997 became an efficient instrument in the election
of the political elite but mobilisation alone is not enough.
For activists to be effective they should be participatory
and not passive. For leaders to be democratic and not oligarchic
they should be held to account from below through internally
democratic political organisation, as well as the votes through
elections.
An elite that contends that the occasional plebiscites fulfil
the democratic requirement frowns upon this constraint. Along
with this direct democracy among the membership go the policy
determinants by focus groups among the electorate. Americanised
focus group techniques have multiple uses. On the one hand
they allow pragmatic politicians to devise policy and language
to appeal to volatile voters. However they can be manipulated
to validate the direction in which the leadership is taking
the party. Focus group participants, it is argued, are more
likely to reflect individual and not collective interest.
Furthermore information from these groups is in the hands
of the political consultants. They have control of a commodity
with a greater value to the technocratic politician than ideological
values held by their colleagues.
An end to ideology may appear seductive but without ideas
to drive change politics stagnate and without debate informed
choices cannot be made. In an adversarial political system,
admittedly, debate can be characterised as division and the
narrative about Labour in the eighties is one of splits and
rows with the leadership. While it is undoubtedly true that
mistakes were made, to thus characterise this period is a
distortion. The high point of the 'left activist' was the
period between 1981 and 1983. After that the leadership re-asserted
itself and the transition of the party began. That time is
now used as an excuse for the greater centralisation of the
party. While the decentralisation of the state continues with
devolution in Scotland and Wales aiding the peace process
in Northern Ireland and the re-establishment of home rule,
centralisation of the party process continues. It is worth
noting that those political commentators who blithely talk
of the end of politics as a response to low turnout in elections
play a dangerous game. When power was devolved to Northern
Ireland and the politicians got down to talking about mundane
issues Martin McGuiness said, "We now have to make the politics
work." When the politics doesn't work the fighting begins.
For the new breed of leadership, democracy is not about debate
or discussion, it is about finding appropriate means to give
legitimacy, without serious challenge, to decisions already
taken and their course already determined. In 1993 when John
Smith and John Prescott staked their political reputations
on winning OMOV at the party conference the value of open
democratic debate was demonstrated. Opposition to OMOV came
primarily from those who thought that it was the first move
in the divorce from the party and the trade unions. Insofar
as Mr. Smith was concerned it would be a fair assumption to
make that OMOV was to be the last of the reforms to the Labour
Party. When Tony Blair ran as leader following John Smith's
death he put further modernisation on the cards. Yet during
the leadership contest he had ruled out the one change which
was the modernisers' greatest prize - dropping Clause IV.
However that was out of political expediency, since he did
not wish to alienate sections of the electoral college which
would determine the political outcome. It was not until his
first speech to the party conference as leader that he indicated
his true intention regarding what had in any event become
largely totemic - removing Clause IV with its commitment to
public ownership. It was not, however, a proclamation and
it was left to the spin doctors to clarify Mr. Blair's words
which were disguised as wanting to create 'a clear up-to-date
statement of the aims and objectives of our party'. Alastair
Campbell, Tony Blair's press secretary described it later
as a political coup.
This decision made in secret by a tiny elite was a precursor
to New Labour's methods of operation. OMOV was abandoned when
it did not suit the technocratic fixing tendencies of the
leadership, as in Wales and currently in the search for a
candidate as the first directly elected Mayor of London. All
talk of divorce from the trade unions was ended when it was
re-discovered that some are useful in fixing votes for the
leadership in time honoured tradition. Whereas the forces
of democracy previously tamed the market, now with the forces
of globalisation and the capitulation to the free market,
the impression is one of impotence of nation states. Yet this
need not be. Lionel Jospin the French social democrat Prime
Minister has declared that while he favours a market economy
he does not favour a market society. Democratic governments
have to determine the pace of change: not big business whose
interests and priorities are for profits and minimising labour
costs. When politicians become mere technocrats with target
and delivery mentalities then, as Professor David Marquand
said at the conference, "democracy is in danger of being tamed
in favour of the market".
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