udging from the aura of triumphalism
surrounding Tony Blair at this year’s Labour conference,
the party hierarchy appears to have learned very
little from its near death experience at the general
election in May. Labour has secured its “historic
third term” with a safe parliamentary majority
and anyone expressing concern about the fact that
this happened in spite of a big slump in the party’s
electoral support is accused of disloyalty and
defeatism. It’s a little reminiscent of the
last Conservative government’s tactic of
attacking anyone who pointed out that its policies
had created two recessions for “talking the
economy down”. Blaming the messenger is so
much easier than facing up to the truth.
By historic standards, Labour’s majority
of sixty-four seats is certainly high. On only
two occasions prior to 1997 has the party managed
to secure a majority of more than single figures – in
1945 under Attlee and in 1966 under Wilson. But
that’s where the good news ends. In terms
of share of the vote, Labour’s 35.2% is only
marginally higher that the 34.4% Neil Kinnock scored
in 1992 – a result deemed so bad that it
required a programme of radical modernisation – and
actually lower than the 36.9% Jim Callaghan secured
when he lost in 1979. The scale of Labour’s
reversal is even greater when we consider that
another abnormally low turnout (61%) meant that
Labour’s vote accounted for a mere 21.6%
of the registered voters. Moreover, the closeness
of the results means that Labour now holds forty-one
ultra-marginals (those with a majority of less
than 5%) compared to just twenty in the last parliament.
Labour’s margin going into the next election
will be much tighter than its sixty-four seat majority
suggests.
For a single party to govern with such low levels
of popular support is without precedent. As the
Electoral Reform Society noted in its scathing
analysis of the result: ‘In terms of active
public consent for government, Britain is almost
back in the pre-reform era of rotten boroughs.’ Yet
there is very little recognition in the senior
reaches of the Labour Party that this poses any
particularly serious problems of democratic legitimacy
or political strategy. The Government will carry
on as if nothing has changed, using the parliamentary
whip to drive through controversial and unpopular
bills and refusing to act on its broken promise
to give the British people a referendum on electoral
reform. Blairite loyalists insist they have a moral
as well as a constitutional mandate to govern based
on polls showing that voters preferred a Labour
to a Conservative government by a margin of 52%
to 35%. While it is entirely plausible that most
of those who voted for someone other than the main
two parties saw Labour as the lesser of two evils,
it would be extremely foolish to behave as if they
had actually voted for the party. Therein lies
the basis for the kind of backlash that could sweep
Labour from power for another generation.
The electorate returned the Conservatives to power
in 1992 for want of a credible alternative and
turned savagely against them as soon as one appeared.
The current political mood is more than a little
reminiscent of that era. We have a visibly weary
and demoralised governing party with an unpopular
leader associated with a discredited policy (swap
Iraq for poll tax) and nothing better to offer
than more of the same. Add to this Labour’s
crumbling local government base (a mirror image
of the trend that prefigured the Conservative Party’s
national collapse), and its dwindling, ageing and
increasingly passive membership, and we have many
of the classic ingredients for a seismic shift
in the balance of political power.
Whether this happens at the next election will
depend to a significant extent on the Conservatives’ ability
to get their act together as a serious political
force. It will also depend on whether Labour can
renew itself in power in ways that allow it to
reconnect with the four million voters it has lost
since 1997.
The omens are not good. Instead of trying to build
bridges to Labour’s disillusioned supporters,
the prevailing reaction of Ministers and party
managers has been to heap scorn on them. Even before
polling day, those contemplating a protest vote
were dismissed as self-indulgent, middle class
liberals: “dinner party critics who quaff
Shiraz or Chardonnay”, according to Peter
Hain. Indeed, this curiously New Labour form of
class hate has become something of a running theme.
It has been advanced in a more subtle form by Health
Minister Liam Byrne in his somewhat misnamed “freethinker
paper” for the Fabian Society. On the basis
of some rather doubtful psephological analysis,
Byrne makes several points: that the liberal, urban
intellectuals who feel most estranged from New
Labour are a tiny segment (4%) of the electorate,
that pandering to them would risk alienating larger
and more important voter groups, that Labour lost
votes to the right as well as the left and that
the only battleground that counts at the next election
will be the fight against the Conservatives for
the political centre.
His conclusions ignore some rather important pieces
of evidence to the contrary. As YouGov discovered,
among the 32% of voters identifying themselves
as Labour supporters, 13% voted Liberal Democrat
and 9% failed to vote – a total of 7% of
the electorate. Either there are more urban intellectuals
than Byrne thinks or the phenomenon of Labour supporters
deserting their party is more widespread. Evidence
of a serious loss of support to the right is even
thinner. Of the thirty-one seats the Conservatives
gained from Labour, only twelve were won because
of a rise in the Conservative vote. The rest fell
because Labour lost votes to other parties, principally
the Liberal Democrats.
There was only one region in the country (the
South East) where the Conservatives recorded a
bigger rise in their share of the vote than the
Liberal Democrats. Everywhere else they were well
behind and actually saw their vote drop in five
out of nine English regions. Nor can there be any
serious doubt about the reasons for this trend.
On election day a Sky News poll showed that one-quarter
of Liberal Democrats voters would have supported
Labour but for the Iraq War, matching almost exactly
the loss of Labour votes since 2001.
The collective refusal to come to terms with what
has happened shows that New Labour, as a pragmatic
political project, is now dead. Among the valuable
contributions it made to the Labour’s revival
as a party of power in the 1990s was a rejection
of outdated shibboleths and an insistence that
it should always engage with voters on their own
terms. All of that is now history. It clearly never
occurred to the Blairites that in a first-past-the-post
electoral system their political coalition could
fracture to the left as well as the right.
It was always assumed that the party’s core
support would have nowhere else to go and could
be ignored or even ridiculed for the purposes of
triangulation. As a consequence they have none
of the tools required to recoup Labour’s
lost progressive votes, hence the regression to
the old Bennite mentality of ‘no compromise
with the electorate’. Where New Labour was
once ruthlessly pragmatic in adapting to the times,
its approach to political strategy has degenerated
into a crude Pavlovian reflex. It doesn’t
matter what the question is, the answer will always
be a further lurch to the right.
Labour cannot begin to meet the challenge of renewal
while Tony Blair remains in office, and the longer
he stays, the harder it will be for his successor
to arrest and reverse the party’s decline.
New Labour’s inability to sustain the impressively
broad electoral coalition of the centre and left
that put it in power means that it must now be
replaced by a new style of progressive politics.
The Blairites are right to warn against ‘a
sharp swing to the left’, as Byrne puts it,
but wrong to argue that their own brand centrist
minimalism is the only serious option. There are
plenty of things Labour could do to reconnect with
its political base without threatening its hold
on the centre. Adopting a foreign policy more independent
of Washington would be a hugely popular step across
the political spectrum. A new top rate of tax for
those earning more than £100,000 would affect
very few people, most of whom will never vote Labour.
Replacing student fees with a graduate tax would
be seen as a fairer way of funding higher education.
But there is one major change that Labour needs
to embrace if it is to extend its period in office
and create more space for progressive politics,
and that is the adoption of a new electoral system
for Westminster. It is ironic that Byrne makes
the argument that Labour cannot afford to be hostage
to 4% of the electorate, since that is precisely
the proportion of voters holding the balance of
power under first-past-the-post (20% of voters
in the most marginal 20% of seats). Moreover, the
socio-economic profile of this group is unrepresentative
of Britain as a whole and creates a ‘centre
ground’ well to the right of the nation’s
true political centre. This option may be forced
onto Labour’s political agenda anyway it
loses those forty-one ultra marginals, so it would
be preferable to make the change from a position
of relative strength.
The skewed arithmetic of our current electoral
system is already in danger of dragging the Liberal
Democrats to the right and Labour needs a strategy
for re-engaging with them as potential partners.
If it fails to develop one, the next phase of
British politics may be a realignment of the right
in the form of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat
coalition.
David Clark is an ex-government advisor
and writes for The Guardian. |