

EUROPE

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Breaking the silence on Europe and Brexit

Boris Johnson's promise was for a Brexit so soft you would scarcely be able to feel the downside. It would be a knife that only cut one way. All the anticipated problems would soon vanish and the good times roll. The UK would be "freed" from the sclerotic bureaucracy of Brussels. Global Britain would rise from this bonfire of vanities. In the meantime, there would - despite the Northern Ireland protocol - be seamless trade between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and despite the ending of free movement, the status of EU citizens residing in the UK would remain unchanged. The world would beat a path to our door to sign up trade deals.

It sounded too good to be true, because it was. Brexit would transform everything, but change nothing. Britain would be liberated but remain the same. A new world would be born, but go on like before. Johnson's vision was scarcely to be believed.

Whereas many people - notably in the Labour Party leadership - believe we should abandon the political argument over the future of Britain and Europe, *Chartist* and *Another Europe is Possible* disagree. We believe we must continue to address these issues head on, and put forward the case for an alternative to Johnson's Brexit and a progressive relationship with Europe.

The careless assumption that the 'red wall' fell because of Labour's Brexit policy needs stress testing. Brexit is arguably an effect, not the cause, of Labour's setbacks in its old heartlands. Ignored and marginalised for a quarter of a century, revolting against public services crippled by austerity, and wages stagnant or falling, for many Brexit was a cry of protest against a broken system.

This is also not a British problem, but a global one. Look around Europe as the populists and xenophobes grow in

Hungary and Poland, and Socialist and Social Democratic parties either disappear down political sinkholes of their own making in France, Germany and Italy, or remodel themselves like the Danish Socialists - even in an era of lax definitions - to no longer warrant the name. The English might like to believe in their own exceptionalism, but these trends are global.

Now we have a series of crises hanging over us. Hundreds of thousands of EU citizens living in Britain are threatened by the looming deadline over Pre-Settled Status, while in Northern Ireland the 'grace period' for sausages and minced meat is due to expire. Johnson sees the second as an existential crisis warranting the pushing of emergency button Article 16 in the EU Agreement, but not the first, and threatens to trigger a trade war with the EU over breakfast.

England's fishermen were told they would be able to catch more fish, but not that there would be nowhere to sell them. The Trade Deals are coming. The one with Japan, to be fair, is only marginally worse than the one we had with Tokyo when we were part of the EU. Brussels is closing in on a deal with Australia, but theirs won't have the toxic agricultural clauses buried in ours. The EU, belatedly, is beginning to shape an independent Common Foreign and Security Policy and Defence Policy, addressing the post-Trump reality that America may not be a reliable partner in the future. It's new turn away from austerity with the 'Next Generation EU' stimulus programme is welcome, but needs to go much further.

So, what future for post-Brexit UK and the European Union? Here *Chartist* and *Another Europe is Possible* kick start the debate on the future with a series of pieces reflecting on the promise and pitfalls of European integration in the twenty-first century.

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How Thatcherite is Brexit?

Luke Cooper says we will soon find out

What was it that gave Thatcherism its ideological coherence and power? In part, as Stuart Hall observed at the time, it was the visceral appeal of a finely tuned ‘moral’ narrative.

Thatcherism contained two key elements. Firstly, an authoritarian agenda, rife with patriarchal, homophobic and racist politicking and highly coercive in its use of power. Secondly, a libertarian economics, stripping away the managerial role of the state and its remit to protect the public interest from runaway free markets. This recipe sparked tremendous resistance and adulation in equal measure, securing the ‘Iron Lady’ three thumping election victories, though only thanks to an un-proportional electoral system.

Thatcher held individual competition, hard work and sacrifice to be the spiritual engine of the nation. The suffering of some was the cost for the vitality and morality of the British people. ‘The only way we can achieve great things for Britain is by asking great things of Britain’, as she put it in her 1982 conference speech. The patient was the nation, the market was the medicine, and crippling unemployment and deindustrialisation the side effect.

The ‘culture wars’ of today carry strong echoes of Thatcher’s socially authoritarian agenda. Yet, as I argue in my book, *Authoritarian Contagion*, the new Toryism has quietly dropped the most hardline aspects of the ‘get on your bike’ language of the 1980s. This forms part of a post-neoliberal global shift characterised by the return of the interventionist state.

Johnson’s 2019 election campaign did not invoke Thatcher’s ‘there’s no such thing as society’ philosophy. Instead, he employed a different set of political and ‘moral’ claims. Johnson committed to ‘level up Britain’, in an historical irony appealing directly to areas of the country that were devastated by Thatcher’s economic agenda. At one stage, he even cast himself as a consistent opponent of the austerity seen in the Cameron and Osborne years.



In policy terms, too, the state was back. Brexit Britain would harness the power of government spending to level up ‘left behind’ towns. An industrial strategy (a frequently rubbished term in the Thatcher and Blair eras), including venture capital and investment in new technology, would, he argued, ‘unleash Britain’s potential’. In distributional terms – that is, those he suggested would benefit and why – the narrative Johnson crafted was also really quite different to 1980s Toryism. Whereas Thatcher promised those who worked hard would be rewarded in the new dog-eat-dog Britain she created, Johnson’s agenda was not qualified meritocratically. All Britons, he suggested, would share in the ‘Brexit dividend’.

With, or against, Thatcherism?

Thatcherism was, however, a hugely powerful intervention not just because of a moral philosophy and grand vision that many found compelling. It backed these ideals with clear policy prescriptions: home ownership, privatisation, deregulation (especially in the City of London), austerity and brutal attacks on the right to organise unions. Indeed, Thatcher sought – and achieved – a fundamental change in the balance of power between capital and labour.

Johnson’s message in the 2019 election suggested he understood the ‘winds of change’ sweeping globally were moving in the opposite direction, away from the untrammelled free markets towards state-directed economic

policy. Yet, Johnson’s policy is rife with internal contradictions. Many in his cabinet still want to build on Thatcher’s legacy.

The most effective means to achieve what Johnson claims to want – a ‘levelled up’, high investment Britain – would be to stay closely aligned with the European market. Small businesses and manufacturers benefiting from state assistance could then export easily to the huge market on the doorstep. As its standards are fairly high and the UK is for the most part already in alignment with them, this would bring few regulatory or economic shocks.

Yet, instead of this, Johnson has pursued a hard Brexit. He is also seeking a series of ‘high cost, low reward’ deregulatory trade deals that run in direct contradiction to his stated economic agenda. Agreements with Australia and the Transpacific Partnership will put 30,000 jobs in the already struggling British steel industry in danger. They pose profound challenges to our agricultural sector already reeling from the disruptions of Brexit. Our food and regulatory standards could be dumped as the British market is flooded with industrially produced foodstuffs. Corporate courts would also dramatically empower big global investors.

These trade negotiations do at least have one silver lining. They force Johnson to make a decision. Will he decide to resurrect the hardline deregulation of the Thatcher era? Or will he pursue instead an agenda closer to the one he promised in 2019? How Johnson answers these questions presents significant risks to his political appeal and authority. If he chooses – as seems likely – the deregulatory, neo-Thatcherite agenda, then he will, in effect, have to abandon much of the substance of what he has promised. As the ultimate political Houdini, he may well find a way to muddle through these policy contradictions. But against the global backdrop of a move away from classical neoliberalism, and with hard Brexit leaving Britain diplomatically and economically isolated, the progressive side of politics needs to find the courage to go on the offensive against this incoherent new Toryism.



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The human security agenda

As the EU sets up a geo-political commission **Mary Kaldor** asks what should the EU's foreign policy be?

In her letter, appointing Josep Borell as High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, Ursula van der Leyen argued that internal and external policy are, 'two sides of the same coin' and called for a geo-political commission. More recently, there has been talk about a geo-political Europe and/or strategic autonomy. But what does this mean?

In theory, EU foreign policy is already based on human security, generally contrasted to national or bloc security, the usual stuff of geopolitics. Human security is that of the individual and their community. It is security from physical (war, repression or crime) as well as material threats (poverty, disease, and environmental degradation); and, in an EU context, is about spreading the internal security based on rights, the rule of law and policing outwards. As outlined in the *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy*, EU foreign policy is about promoting a rules-based global governance, an integrated approach to conflict and crisis management, and a new form of public diplomacy that engages with civil society, and not just governments. It's Robin Cook's ethical foreign policy writ large. As Borell has put it, 'The EU was established to abolish power politics. It built peace and the rule of law by separating hard power economics, rule-making and soft power'.

The EU is developing a defence and security capability so it can play a more effective role in crisis situations, within a multilateral framework. At present, the EU has 18 overseas military and civilian missions, deploying 5000 personnel. They include roles in security sector reform, rule of law promotion and supporting community policing. Two very successful missions were Operation Artemis in 2004, which stopped a massacre in Eastern DRC, and the ongoing Operation Atalanta, the Gulf anti-piracy mission. The latter adopted an explicitly human security approach, arresting rather than killing pirates, and linking the mission to social initiatives, such as the introduction of fishing licences on the coast of



EU COPPS supports Palestinian police in Ramallah

Somalia.

What does the proposed turn to geo-politics mean? It could mean placing more emphasis on military power and the defence of borders, like a classic nation-state. Some fear that increased co-operation on defence and security betokens the construction of a European army on a super-power model. The strengthening of borders to control immigration also points in this direction.

On the other hand, it could reference playing a more active and independent political role. The EU's problem is each member state has its own foreign policy and the increasingly contested principle of unanimity stands in the way of a general EU approach. Some member states support the human security or 'normative' approach, mainly the Scandinavians and Spain and Portugal, some favour acting as junior partners to the US and strengthening NATO, while a third group pursue divergent national, including post-colonial interests. The EU's extensive 'low politics' or soft power – economic aid, civil society support, or multilateral missions – cannot be matched for now by 'high politics'.

Two examples illustrate the point. Before the September meeting of EU foreign policy chiefs, Borrell had breakfast with Svetlana Tikonovskaya, the leader of the Belarussian opposition. The EU is providing €63 million in medical assistance, legal assistance, emergency support for civil society and

independent media. But it was only once the regime engaged in international piracy, forcing a Ryanair flight carrying a dissident to land, that the EU was able to overcome the unanimity problem and impose targeted sanctions on the regime.

The other example is Palestine. Brussels support the Palestinian Authority, providing some €600 million a year, regularly paying to repair the damage caused by the Israeli occupation. The EU has two missions: EU Rafah, supposedly aimed at keeping the border between Gaza and Egypt open and EU COPPS in support of the Palestinian police. Yet Israeli pressure has closed the border and the police role in Palestine has been marginalised by security forces trained by the US and Iran. The EU is hopelessly divided over Palestine. Germany retains a traditional commitment to the state of Israel, and Hungary openly partners despite its domestic anti-semitism, while others are more sympathetic to the Palestinian cause.

'Geopolitical Europe' could mean acting more autonomously and effectively at 'high politics', leveraging the EU's power and influence it possesses. Borrell wants 'constructive abstention' replacing the veto alongside the promotion of a common strategic culture. Yet, the most effective steps would be to strengthen EU democracy, giving the European Parliament a greater role in EU foreign policy and expanding the channels for civic participation.



Mary Kaldor is Professor of Global governance at the LSE and a member of a the national committee for Another Europe is

What role for the Parliament in Europe's future?

Glyn Ford on hesitant steps to democratise the architecture of the EU

One of the Tory/BREXIT canards about the European Union (EU) were claims to its undemocratic nature. There was a 'democratic deficit', but Brussels was far less overdrawn in that account than claimed. It was all a bit rich coming from a country, whose own political architecture, with its patronage House of Lords chamber, would fail to meet the EU's more stringent post Soviet Empire criteria for membership, and one that frustrated, when not sabotaging attempts to address the shortfall.

Each successive EU Treaty shrank the credibility gap - the Single European Act, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon - by augmenting the power of the European Parliament (EP). It was Lisbon, the last, ratified in 2010 whose unintended consequences, provided the EU's modern suffragettes the institutional framework to subvert the rule of the European Council's oligarchs. Now the Commission President was to be rubber stamped by the EP. For the Socialists if confirmation of President was to be the domain of the EP why stop there? Why not select as well as elect, commandeer and pre-empt the candidate selection with personality welded to political platform for 2014? The Party of European Socialists (PES) led the way and a hesitant European People's Party (EPP) followed.

The PES selected Martin Schulz and the EPP Jean Claude Juncker. Shultz was the unanimous choice. The EPP, in contrast, at their Dublin Congress, with delegates representing 73 parties from 39 countries, elected Jean Claude Juncker over Michael Barnier 382-245. Dublin looked like a dog, barked like a dog, and answered to the name of 'fido'. It was a Presidential Convention in all but name. The candidates covered the continent with rallies, TV debates and mass campaigns.

Schulz and Juncker did the deal, agreeing to rally around the candidate with most MEPs in the



'de facto' EP electoral college. The outcome was 221 v 191 to the EPP. Despite Merkel's antipathy and Cameron and Orbán's opposition, Juncker was nominated and elected by 422 to 250. For two and a half years with Schulz as EP President and Juncker in the Berlaymont (the European Commission HQ in Brussels) it was virtually a diarchy as the two phoned each other a dozen times a day.

In the run-up to the 2019 Elections, the EPP select Manfred Weber at their Helsinki Congress while the PES chose Dutch Socialist, Frans Timmermans, in Madrid. This time there was no deal. Both main parties suffered to the benefit of the Liberals and Greens with the EPP widening the gap over the PES to 182-154, but with an overall clear centre/centre-left win at the expense of the right.

Merkel stabbed Timmermans in the front and Weber in the back in her distaste for the system. Despite Timmermans guaranteed win in the Council, she proposed a favourite daughter in

Ursula von der Leyen, who in the EP only scraped over the 374 threshold by 9 votes (out of 747). Merkel's manipulation had been a dangerous gamble. For in the struggle between democrats and oligarchs the EP has a secret weapon, Rule 124 (4), 'If the candidate does not obtain the required majority, the President shall invite the European Council to propose a new candidate within one month for election in accordance with the same procedure'. The process recycles endlessly. Any Council decision to overrule the EP risks triggering a Constitutional crisis.

Once one candidate is rejected the chances of each subsequent candidate decline. If the EP holds its nerve there can only be one winner.

The run up to 2024 may, in consequence, see Europe's political families choose to drive rather than subvert the process. Labour in the PES needs to promote vision not division. After all there is a limit to how many times you can play 'double or quits' and expect to win.



Glyn Ford is a former Member of the European Parliament

EU citizen rights: a frontline in fighting the Tory vision for Britain

Alena Ivanova on broken Tory promises and the plight of EU citizens in Britain



In the run-up to the Brexit Referendum, Boris Johnson promised “nothing will change” for European nationals living in the UK. This could hardly be further from the truth.

Instead, EU/EEA nationals were made to re-apply for their right to stay and millions are given only a temporary guarantee - the Pre-Settled Status, which lasts five years and needs to be upgraded into the (more secure) Settled Status via another application. This was already a betrayal of the promise made in the referendum. However, beyond the bitter taste Brexit leaves in the mouth of most EU nationals, there are also multiple serious issues with the design of the scheme in practice. This risks many thousands of individual families facing insecurity in the coming months and years.

Campaigners have been warning the government that putting a hard deadline to their application scheme will inevitably mean thousands of EEA nationals living lawfully in the UK at present will lose

their immigration status overnight on 1 July. Frontline organisations report a rush in cases referred to them as local authorities and other services scramble to reach as many EEA nationals as possible. There will inevitably be those who fall through the cracks and miss out – often the more vulnerable. Johnson said he hopes the law will be ‘merciful’ to those in this situation. But he has made no legal provision that could allow for this. As it stands, those who fall through the cracks will lose their right to work, rent or use health-care overnight.

Another disaster in the making is the situation with workers who have been granted pre-settled status but who have been impacted by the pandemic with job losses or business closures.

Many will have opted to leave the UK and weather the storm back home for the time being in order to limit their expenses on things like housing and transport. Thousands of those workers will find themselves locked out of permanent settlement in the UK,

however. Even when economic life resumes as before, they will have broken the 6-month rule, which regulates the amount of time you can spend outside the UK in a five-year period in order to qualify for Settled Status.

In practice, these workers will still have jobs - if they want them, and they will still be able to use their pre-settled status until it expires. But once that runs out, thousands will have to turn to the much more stringent visa system.

That’s the real cruelty of Tory immigration policy. Their goal is not to actually limit migration numbers, but the rights and opportunities of immigrants. Migrants who have less secure immigration status are more vulnerable to super-exploitation in the workplace and may feel less able to organise for better conditions and union rights. In this sense, replacing the rights-based system of freedom of movement with the insecurities and vulnerabilities of the new system was always an issue of class politics. This makes citizen rights a key frontline in fighting the Tory vision for Britain.



Alena Ivanova is an organiser for Another Europe is Possible

Conference on the Future of Europe

Niccolo Milanese investigates a citizens empowerment initiative

With little fanfare and little awareness outside the institutions, the grandly titled 'Conference on the Future of Europe' has started on 9th May and will continue until next spring. 'What is it all about?' is a question with no easy answer. It can often seem like everyone has their own idea.

Originally conceived by French President Macron as a way to move forward European integration and turn the page from the Brexit negotiations, it was then taken up by the surprise nominee for the President of the European Commission Ursula Von Der Leyen following the European elections in 2019. She saw it as a way of compensating for her lack of democratic legitimacy, (she had not been one of the 'Spitzenkandidaten' of the political parties in the election, and so was effectively imposed by the member-states, rejecting the European Parliament nomination system).

According to Von Der Leyen's vision the conference was supposed to focus on electoral reform and start on the 9th May 2020. The European Parliament put forward Guy Verhofstadt as its candidate for the president of the Conference, who has made no secret of his ambition to use it to get rid of the unanimity requirement at the Council and thereby push forward a certain vision of European federalism. This was too much for some member state governments, and negotiations about who should preside over the whole exercise, combined with the global pandemic, lead to a delay of one year.

The conference only began once an overly complicated tripartite governance structure of the Conference had been agreed upon. In the meantime both greater integration and coordination in health policies, and a significant leap in fiscal integration through the recovery funds and joint borrowing in the Union, mean that a 'health union' and economic questions are high on the agenda. These measures will likely be keenly debated both by those who want to see much more



integration and those who want to make the measures of the last year an exceptional and one off.

Prospects: towards a citizens' Europe?

'So much, so familiar', those who follow European affairs may wearily say, but there is also some significant novelty here in the way the whole Conference is supposed to be 'citizen centred'. Taking some inspiration from the successes of citizens assemblies as ways of overcoming political blockages, most notably in the experience of Ireland and legalisation of abortion, the Conference will hold randomly selected citizens panels, and welcome citizens into the plenary alongside the politicians. Quite how this will work and what role the citizens will play is still under negotiation, even as the process starts, and the whole exercise has something of the character of an experiment. Yet, this unpredictable character is perhaps what is most interesting: it could fizzle out with barely anyone noticing; it risks attempts to hijack it from authoritarian governments and reactionary forces; and it risks any citizens participation being only selectively engaged with by

the most powerful elements of the European status quo to give a veneer of legitimacy to what they anyway planned to do.

Nonetheless, it also perhaps presents the possibility of changing significantly the way the European institutions engage with citizens, and presenting new opportunities for civil society movements and organisations to get their foot in the door. Dissatisfaction with the opportunities for citizens participation given from above is easy: many are excluded, and the participation on offer is always rather carefully circumscribed. British citizens who still feel deeply European are not formally invited to participate at all. But who would allow the future to be created in this formalistic way alone?

Movements like Citizens Takeover Europe are taking the opportunity to mobilise inside and outside the formal Conference structures, to at once demand and enact a different Europe of solidarity, equality, care and rights. They can count on the strength that they will be around long after the Conference has finalised its reports and formal conclusions.



Niccolo Milanese is the Director of **European Alternatives** and the co-author of **Citizens of Nowhere; How Europe Can be Saved From Itself**. For more information on the **Citizens Takeover Europe coalition** visit **CitizensTakeOver.EU**

European Green Deal

Ann Pettifor on opening up space for combatting climate breakdown

There is much to admire about the roadmap and key policies that make up the European Green Deal. It has opened up political space across the continent, and across a range of countries, for debates on how economies can adapt to, and prepare for climate breakdown and the loss of biodiversity. Debate in Anglo-American economies on the Green New Deal has largely petered out – buried by the pandemic, the politics of identity, nationalism and protectionism.

Second, the EU Green Deal has set (and the EU is considering raising) binding targets for 40% Greenhouse Gas (GHG) reduction from 1990 levels by 2030; for an increase in the share of renewable energy to 32% and indicative targets for energy efficiency. Subject to further debate and engagement with member states these targets will be enshrined in law and will apply to the twenty seven countries of the Union. Even while there are fierce debates and differences, with Poland and Hungary as outliers, nevertheless, nowhere else in the world is there a similar level of inter-governmental coordination and cooperation at regional level, with the aim of tackling climate breakdown and biodiversity collapse.

Third, the priority accorded to the climate crisis provides the Union with off-the-shelf policies and targets that could aid job creation and economic recovery from the coronavirus crisis. Meanwhile the increasingly uneconomic extraction of coal will likely mute Polish and Czech political resistance to the Green Deal.

While these are encouraging developments, the Green Deal suffers from three weaknesses.

The first is the failure to set specific carbon-reduction, energy efficiency and renewable energy targets for each country of the Union. The second more serious weakness is the pitifully small sums of money allocated for the immense programme of work required for the radical and urgent transformation of Europe's energy, transport and land-use systems. The third weakness of the Green Deal is also structural, and can be located in the growing, and increasingly divisive economic divergences between



member states. That structural weakness must be addressed for the Green New Deal to be meaningful.

Perhaps the greatest weakness of Mrs von der Leyen's Green Deal is the dearth of finance it is proposed would be mobilised for this transformational programme. The meagre sums proposed can be explained by the inability of the EU Commission to draw on the power and resources of a central bank to generate the liquidity needed to finance public investment in economic transformation. Instead, the Commission is forced to draw on Europe's existing and limited public and private savings. These include a percentage of the paltry EU budget (barely 1% of the EU's gross national income) plus savings mobilised by the InvestEU Fund and the EU Investment Bank. The EU Green Investment Plan aims to raise EUR one trillion over ten years. The EIB Group will aim to support €1 trillion of investments in climate action and environmental sustainability "in the critical decade from 2021 to 2030". These negligible sums to be expended over long time periods are entirely inadequate for the scale of transformation needed if Europe is to achieve Green Deal ambitions.

Contrast these sums to the speed and scale of finance committed by

the ECB and European governments in March, 2020 and designed to keep Europe's private and globalised capital markets liquid. The ECB's emergency purchase programme (PEPP) committed €1,350 billion to bail out the finance sector and did so almost instantaneously. The interest rate on its main refinancing operations, the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility were quickly lowered to an extraordinary 0.00%, 0.25% and -0.50% respectively. This largesse was supplemented by tax breaks and fiscal spending by member states that drew on present and future contributions (savings) of Europe's taxpayers.

The unprecedented ECB interventions were intended to maintain life support for a European finance sector that was in a comatose state after the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-9. Its lending to these institutions will add to unsustainably high levels of debts owed by financial and non-financial corporations, and has undoubtedly been gambled away on stock markets, on stock buybacks and on other forms of speculation. Green Deal investments by contrast, could expand both private and public sector activity, create jobs Europe-wide. Job creation will both revive the private sector, but also generate the tax revenues needed for repayment of public debt, while at the same time the investment would tackle the climate crisis.

We can afford what we can do, John Maynard Keynes once argued. Today we should add that we can afford what we can do within the ecosystem's limits. To finance a transformation of the European economy away from its addiction to fossil fuels, Europe has public institutions; and strong European economies backed by loyal taxpayers, whose regular tax payments provide the ballast (or collateral) that ensures a strong currency. Given these strengths there is no need for Europe to turn to Wall St. or Frankfurt for financing the Green Deal. Instead finance capital should be subordinated to the interests of the people of Europe, and to the future of civilisation. Once the political will to challenge finance capital is mobilised, Europe will be able to afford what it can do within the limits of the ecosystem.



Ann Pettifor is author of *The Case for the Green New Deal & The Production of Money (Verso)* & director of PRIME

Labour should back freedom of movement

Laura Parker explains why Labour needs to operate on its own internationalist constitution

For Labour to fulfil its historic commitment to a just society, it must defend and extend freedom of movement. This is integral to its mission to promote equality, human rights and the rights of all workers.

Despite overwhelming support for freedom of movement amongst its membership and increasing Conservative attacks upon migrant communities, too often Labour has been reluctant to take a principled stand. Its failure to challenge the economic illiteracy regularly served up by the populist right as an excuse for its anti-migrant prejudice has reinforced reactionary, false narratives about immigrants 'putting pressure on public services'. Letting unscrupulous employers off the hook for low wages has simultaneously also encouraged the scapegoating of migrants for low pay and given the Tories an alibi for austerity.

Labour now reaps in electoral terms what it has long sown in relation to migrants rights-because it cannot out-right the right for whom the brutal treatment of migrants is a badge of pride. Without a consistently loud enough voice condemning this, a passive acceptance of state action deliberately designed to dehumanise has taken hold. From 'go home' vans to unmeetable demands for non-existent documents proving residency for people whose entire lives have been in Britain, state-sanctioned hostility has been normalised.



None of this can have any place in the country Labour wants to build or lead. Its role must be to help all understand how interconnected the struggles against racism are, wherever those under attack are from. It must explain the inconsistency of 'taking the knee' whilst tolerating the inhumane treatment of those in the UK's Dickensian detention centres. Rightly decrying the Government's shameful move to cut aid is incomplete without also highlighting how the Conservative Tory charity-begins-at-home approach to international development is part of the same strategy which has led to the UK closing safe routes for child refugees and being complicit in the deaths of people in the Channel.



Laura Parker is the former national secretary of Momentum

In defending free movement, Labour would be recognising a common humanity which the Conservatives wish to deny exists. It would be nurturing the solidarity we have seen during Covid and which we must fight to preserve as the Government seeks to return to hostile business as usual. Above all, it would uphold the values enshrined in Labour's own constitution, Clause IV of which is clear: the just society Labour wants is built upon providing security, nurturing families, delivering people "from the tyranny of poverty, prejudice and the abuse of power". Labour aims to "secure peace, freedom, democracy, economic security... for all". "For all". Not "for all who were born in the UK".

Chartist, AEIP and internationalism

Europe has to be at the heart of any Labour internationalism. Despite Brexit Chartist will keep up pressure on Labour and AEIP on all parties to maintain an outward looking European focus. We acknowledge flaws with the European Union but it is the only elected democratic forum within which progressives have to operate. We must ensure the dire consequences of Brexit are exposed, particularly now that the pandemic is slowly abating and the realities in terms of job losses, civil rights, loss of free movement, environmental and food standards, can and must be exposed.

Furthermore, results in local and recent byelections reveal that the Tories are vulnerable in 'Remain' voting areas and if Labour is not to lose out to other parties it must maintain a pro-Europe focus.

Another Europe is Possible continues to campaign for the rights of EU citizens, champion free movement, expose the iniquities of any Tory 'free trade deals' and fly the flag for a citizen's internationalism.

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