Gill Bennett on the Cold War from the Soviet perspective
The World of the Cold War 1945-1991 by Vladislav Zubok published by Penguin
Do we really need another history of a conflict that, for many—especially the so-called “Gen Z”—seems like ancient history? Many aspects of that long, tense standoff, begun in Europe yet spreading to much of the world, appear not just distant but incredible to younger people. And for those seeking to make sense of current events, the argument that the world is entering a “second” Cold War was always weak and serves little useful purpose. Nevertheless, the events of 1945-1991 can inform our understanding of current developments, and there are good reasons to welcome this refreshing new account. It adds crucial context at a time when, as Zubok points out, binary ideological differences may have disappeared or at least evolved, “nationalist pride, power games and geopolitical fears” appear immune to change and continue to drive conflict.
In contrast to the majority of Cold War histories, The World of the Cold War draws on Soviet and other Eastern European archives to give due weight to the interests and preoccupations of the “East” (the former Soviet Union and, to some degree, China) as well as the “West” (dominated by the US). This enables deeper analysis and indeed understanding of policymaking on all sides, adding interesting detail, for example, to the Vietnam war, and to the emergence of détente in Europe. It is also particularly important given the strong continuities within Russia’s world outlook. The roots of the Cold War lay less in ideology than in Soviet perceptions of betrayal of their sacrifice in World War II, Western lack of respect for Russia as a Great Power, and a belief in Russia’s “imperial destiny and superiority”; all major drivers of Putin’s policies today.
But the point that emerges most starkly from Zubok’s account of the Cold War is the almost wilful lack of mutual understanding on the part of both East and West, and each side’s apparent inability to learn lessons, to appreciate their own as well as their opponent’s strengths and weaknesses, or to change mindset. Both East and West were guilty of what, in the language of intelligence analysis, would be termed confirmation bias and perseveration: refusing to accept new information that does not conform to existing beliefs, and doing what feels familiar from lack of courage to change. The result was a morass of mutual incomprehension, producing a stalemate in which both East and West became locked into a competitive cycle of dependency very difficult for either side to break.
US administrations were perennially convinced they could set the terms of any relationship, advancing or withdrawing in order to force other powers to behave as the US wanted. This belief in American exceptional destiny produced a rigid and conformist ideology that was, as Zubok shows with interesting new archival evidence, mirrored on the other side of the Iron Curtain. The Soviet regime, hampered by ideological/political constraints from a realistic understanding of its own position, its military strategists blindsided as to their own, as well as Western military strength, saw no better way of enhancing global status than to invest aggressively in a network of clients and satellites. Zubok’s comment that many in the US “felt that they, their culture and their future were being determined by powerful forces outside of their control” surely applied to Soviet thinking too.
This is not to diminish the importance of economic factors that were key determinants of the conflict, rather than politics or ideology. In the end, as Zubok points out, the US did not “win” the Cold War, nor did the USSR simply run out of steam. The collapse of the Soviet Union was, rather, “triggered by Gorbachev’s misguided economic reforms, political liberalization and loss of control of the Soviet state and finances”. But for this reviewer, the most striking—and relevant—feature of this insightful book is Zubok’s convincing portrayal of obstinacy, ignorance and resistance to change on both sides. It is perhaps appropriate to give the last word to China. Neither the US nor USSR anticipated Mao’s triumph in 1949, and both “grossly undervalued the huge public impact of the communist victory . . . for Asia and the world”. And as Zubok observes, after the shock of the establishment of the Communist regime, China “always seemed more attractive as a candidate for inclusion in the global order than Russia”.