Duncan Bowie on the bombing of Japan and the Tokyo war trials
“Rain of Ruin” by Richard Overy published by Allen Lane
“Judgement at Tokyo” by Gary J Bass published by Picador
Overy’s book is a study of American military strategy in the last months of the war with Japan. American political and military leaders had been critical of the British strategy of blanket bombing of German cities on the grounds that targets should be of military value and bombing of residential centres was not justifiable. However, American popular attitudes to the Japanese hardened as information became available on Japanese treatment of captured American soldiers, and American military leaders wanted to avoid the severe losses of American soldiers in the battles to take Iwo Jima and Okinawa, fearing a land assault of the Japanese mainland would involve catastrophic losses, in the belief that Japanese soldiers, in loyalty to their emperor, would fight to the death.
So despite the hesitancy of some in the American political leadership, mass bombing of Japanese cities was undertaken, leading to firebombs that destroyed much of Tokyo and killed tens of thousands of Tokyo’s citizens.
Overy also analyses the dynamics of the Japanese leadership in the final months of the war, when despite a public perception of no surrender, a “peace part” within the Japanese leadership, which included both Hirohito and the prime Minister Tojo, were considering options to end the fighting, proposing mediation by the Soviets.
In the American leaderships’ consideration of using the newly available atomic bomb, there were alternative options – dropping a test bomb to demonstrate its impact in the belief that the Japanese would realise its potential and surrender, or using the bomb on military targets. The American leadership in selecting target sites sought to argue that both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were military targets and that most of the citizens were therefore contributing to the Japanese war effort and were therefore legitimate targets. Kyoto was removed from the target list on the grounds that it was not a military city, though it was its cultural heritage that it was considered should be protected.
Overy points out that historians have tended to focus too much of the two atomic bombs and not sufficiently on the impact of the firebombing of Tokyo and other cities, which was equally destructive. He questions whether the use of the atomic bombs was actually necessary, given that the Japanese leadership was already prepared to negotiate an end to the war and accept the terms set out by the three allied powers in the Potsdam agreement, which included a recognition of the Japanese Emperor’s right to retain his position at the end of the war. The American strategy would now be determined as illegal, as the 1949 and 1977 Geneva Conventions outlawed indiscriminate bombing of civilian populations. As the American bombing chief Curtis LeMay acknowledged, it was just as well they won the war, otherwise, he might have found himself in front of an International War Crimes tribunal.
Bass’s book is not a light read. It is a 600 page comprehensive and systematic study of the international military tribunal held in Tokyo after the end of the Second World War in Asia. 11 international judges (one from each allied country, including India, China and the Philippines) convicted 23 leading Japanese military and political leaders, seven of whom were executed. The trial took two and a half years, not finishing until December 1948. Bass’s book sets out the trial in detail, stage by stage, but also gives the historical background, the backstory, views and after stories of the judges and prosecutors, as well the detail of the charges against each of the accused, a commentary on their past actions, the soundness of the charges and of each conviction.
There is much on the legal basis for the tribunal and comparison with the contemporary Nuremberg trials of the German military and political leadership. General MacArthur, in effect the Governor of occupied postwar Japan, established the tribunal but ensured that Emperor Hirohito was not put on trial as he was considered vital to the postwar stability of the country. This was despite the widely held view by most of the judges that he was as or more guilty than those who were convicted. Yet the judges were divided – the Indian judge, Radhabinod Pal, was opposed to any convictions and questioned the whole basis of the tribunal’s authority with a well-substantiated published dissent, which has been lauded by Japanese nationalist politicians ever since. Many of the convictions and sentences were on split votes and Japanese politicians who had opposed war and favoured negotiations were convicted along with their more militaristic colleagues. This was victors justice with no consideration given to aggressive war and potential war crimes of the Allied powers. This is an excellent study, actually easy to read (if grim), well-researched and fair in the author’s judgements. Highly recommended, and in my view, far more informative than Overy’s book, which is much more narrowly focused.
