Lessons of Hungary’s 1956 uprising

Hungarian Uprising 1956

Andrew Ryder, András Schweitzer and Gabor Halmai pay homage to 1956 and István Bibó while highlighting  their relevance to Ukraine

On October 23rd, Hungarians commemorate the 1956 Revolution during their annual national holiday. It marks the moment when Hungarians rose up against the Soviet system, only to be crushed by an invasion of Soviet forces. It is a sombre day of remembrance and reflection. Hungarians not only honour those who lost their lives during the Soviet crackdown but also consider the continuing relevance of that historic moment in the present day.

As is often the case with memory politics, there are various interpretations of this landmark event that seek to explain contemporary realities. Viktor Orbán, the long-serving prime minister who was defeated in the recent election, interpreted 1956 as an assertion of national sovereignty against external domination. He compared it to resistance to what he characterised as the European Union’s encroachment upon Hungarian sovereignty. By contrast, Péter Magyar, the similarly nationalist but distinctively liberal politician whose victory in the 2026 election brought an end to Orbán’s rule, invoked the legacy of 1956 to argue that Orbán had betrayed the revolution’s core principles. According to Magyar, the uprising embodied a commitment to democracy and alignment with the West, values undermined by Orbán’s weakening of the rule of law, democratic institutions, and his close relationship with Vladimir Putin, including repeated efforts to obstruct European Union support for Ukraine through vetoes and political obstruction, clearly forgetting the lessons and principles of 1956.

István Bibó (1911-1979) – Credit Wikimedia Commons

In doing so, Magyar echoed the sentiments of István Bibó (1911-1979), one of the most important intellectual and political figures associated with the revolution and a lasting inspiration for the dissident movements that operated at the margins of the state socialist system until its collapse in 1989-1990. Few individuals embodied the trials and tribulations of modern Hungary as closely as Bibó. A self-described Christian socialist, Bibó was an intellectual with deeply held liberal democratic values. He served as a civil servant during the Second World War and used his position to help Jews escape persecution and deportation. In the postwar period, he entered academia, but his career suffered because he fell out of favour with the Communist authorities.

During the revolution of 1956, Bibó became a minister in the government of Imre Nagy, the reform communist leader who sought to democratize socialism in Hungary. These reforms alarmed the Soviet leadership, which feared that political liberalisation in Hungary could trigger a broader democratic chain reaction throughout Eastern Europe. In the final stages of the uprising, Bibó became the last remaining representative of the reformist government. Prime Minister Imre Nagy had been detained by Soviet forces, while most other ministers had fled. As Soviet troops surrounded the Parliament building, Bibó drafted the proclamation Freedom and Truth. In this document, he defended the ideals of the revolution, asserting Hungary’s right to self-determination and liberty. He personally delivered copies of the proclamation to foreign embassies in Budapest.

For his role in the revolution, Bibó was sentenced to life imprisonment. He spent six years in prison before being released. Like many intellectuals who opposed the regime, he remained marginalised throughout much of the subsequent period. He was not allowed to publish his works or participate meaningfully in public life. Nevertheless, he became an important source of inspiration for dissident movements across Central and Eastern Europe.

Bibó believed that Hungary’s history had been shaped by a recurring tension between two fundamental orientations. On one side stood the desire to look westward, embracing modernisation, democracy, and constitutional government. On the other hand, there was the tendency to seek security through alignment with powerful empires and more authoritarian political traditions. In his seminal work on The Misery of the Small States of Eastern Europe, he described a historical tendency towards a “political hysteria” in Hungary, which after 2010 became Viktor Orbán’s tool to turn the country into a Russian-friendly autocracy.  For Bibó, the idea of Europe symbolised the rule of law, democracy, and freedom. The backsliding of Hungarian democracy in recent decades can be analysed in multiple ways. Bibó certainly offers a useful framework: Hungary diverted from the organic European development path, where the “cause of community” aligns with the “cause of liberty”. Critics sometimes accused him of idealising the West and overlooking instances when Western societies themselves failed to uphold these values. Nevertheless, Bibó remained a strong advocate of European political progress and cooperation in a value-driven community, a vision clearly opposed by the Orbán regime. This may have been one of the reasons in 2019 for the Orbán government removing the statue of Imre Nagy, a 1956 martyr, from near the Parliament building.

This vision resonated with many Hungarians in the recent election, contributing to Orbán’s defeat and the subsequent effort to restore Hungary’s strained relationship with the European Union. These relations had been severely damaged by repeated concerns over numerous rule-of-law violations during Orbán’s tenure. Bibó did not live to witness Hungary’s transformation to a liberal democracy in 1989-1990, nor its accession to the European Union in 2004. At the time of his death in 1979, European integration was still largely centred on economic cooperation through the European Economic Community. Yet it is likely that he would have welcomed the transformation of the European project into a political community grounded in democratic values, legal norms, and peaceful cooperation. The peaceful resolution of disputes through mutual recognition, objective legal frameworks, and supranational institutions reflected many of the ideals he espoused. For some, the seventieth anniversary of the 1956 Revolution, combined with the normalisation of Hungary’s relations with the European Union, is an occasion to reflect on whether the country is once again honouring the legacy of both 1956 and István Bibó.

Bibó’s vision for Europe also included the end of territorial expansion through aggression. His views nicely fit and could enrich contemporary ideas of International Relations. He imagined the establishment of impartial international institutions capable of arbitrating political disputes and resolving territorial conflicts according to the principle of national self-determination. He would almost certainly have been appalled by the manipulation of ethnic and linguistic self-determination through the staged referendums organised by Vladimir Putin in Crimea and the Donbas to legitimise Russia’s territorial claims. Even more distressing to him would have been the devastating war inflicted upon Ukraine.

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 lasted only a few days after the Soviet invasion of November 4th. A central element of its mythology and enduring national significance is that a relatively small country chose to confront the might of the Soviet Empire and that thousands were willing to fight and die for self-determination, political freedom, and democracy. Ukraine has now been engaged in a similar struggle for four years. On this seventieth anniversary of the uprising, many Hungarians will inevitably reflect upon the parallel between their own historical experience and the war that their neighbour, Ukraine, faces today.

A recent piece of research drawing on a survey experiment of 6,000 people in Slovakia concluded that reflecting on past autocratic experiences neither heightens vigilance over new autocratic government actions nor bolsters commitment to liberal democratic norms where dogmatism is deeply ingrained. It is crucially important that dark past events are properly and effectively memorialised within broader culture. It is also crucially important now that the new Hungarian government changes the policy of its predecessor and supports Ukraine’s fight against the aggressor. So, it matters that people may remember the suppression of 1956 to understand Ukraine’s fight against Putin’s Russia, but equally remember the autocratic Orbán regime to avoid its repetition.

Authors

Professor Gábor Halmai is a professor emeritus of the Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE) in Budapest, Hungary, an alumnus professor of the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence, Italy, and a visiting professor at LUISS University in Rome, Italy.

Professor Andrew Ryder is Director of the Institute of Political and International Studies at ELTE University. Prior to this he held academic positions at the Corvinus University Budapest and the universities of Bristol and Birmingham

Dr András Schweitzer is an Associate Professor in the Institute of Political and International Studies at ELTE University and a recurring visiting professor at Masaryk University in Brno. Earlier, he was employed as a writer and editor by Hungary’s HVG weekly, then worked as an external researcher for the 1956 Institute in Budapest.

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