Andrew Ryder and András Schweitzer hail a landslide victory for democracy and the European Union in Hungary Election
Viktor Orbán has lost the election in Hungary; the new Prime Minister will be Péter Magyar of the Tisza Party. He now enjoys a commanding two-thirds majority that will allow him to make the constitutional and legal reforms to turn Hungary into a proper liberal democracy, moving away from Orbán’s illiberalism and autocracy.
Orbán seemed to be invincible, having been in power since 2010. A key turning point was the scandal in 2024 around the pardoning of a paedophile enabler, which led to the resignation of the President and former Minister of Justice from frontline politics, as they had signed the pardon. It is believed that the paedophile enabler had high-level political and church contacts that sought to protect him. This crisis prompted Péter Magyar, a former Orbán supporter, to form the Tisza Party. The scandal was a key galvaniser in the rapid growth of the party. The political problems of Orbán were compounded by a cost-of-living crisis aggravated by Orbán’s poor stewardship of the economy, in part a product of corruption and cronyism. Public opinion was further inflamed by Orbán’s support for Putin, which, in the mind of some, was an insult to the memory and principles of the 1956 uprising, where Hungary sought to free itself of Soviet rule.
Perhaps a sign of Orbán’s fanaticism and desperation was the belief that the visit by US Vice President Vance to Hungary days before the campaign would be a game-changer and turn the failing campaign around. It failed to do that. Some found Vance’s accusations of EU interference in the election absurd, given that he was in Hungary actively trying to influence the vote in Orbán’s favour, an act which flew against the established convention of not interfering in another country’s election. For some Hungarians, the enthusiastic support of Trump and Vance merely served as a reminder of how far Hungary had fallen from the democratic fold.
Prior to the election, fears were profound that false flag incidents would occur, like the incident where explosives were found near an oil pipeline between Serbia and Hungary, with the Ukrainians being accused of espionage against Hungarian interests. Some feared Orbán would find an excuse to postpone the election on the grounds of national security. Such fears were also a product of reports of Russian intelligence operatives being sent by Putin to Hungary to stage false flag incidents and spread misinformation.
Hungary is now the focus of great international attention. Will Orbán’s defeat impact on Trump in the midterm elections? Is this the beginning of the tide turning against authoritarian populism? How can an authoritarian state be transformed into a liberal democracy? Hungary could become a template and model to defeat authoritarianism, but it could also be a model for all EU member states on how to create a form of democracy that can build trust and be resilient in the face of authoritarianism. In this process, Péter Magyar might want to look to historic moments like the 1956 uprising that sought to eject Soviet power and align Hungary with the West and establish a democracy. Hungary became a huge source of inspiration and hope that Soviet totalitarianism could be challenged and defeated; 70 years later, Hungary could be the centre of a global movement ranged against authoritarianism. The spirit of 1956 lives on.
Remembering 1956: Russia and Hungary’s Love and Hate Relationship
1956 was a crucial year in world history, with the Soviet Union facing the first major internal challenge to its autocracy with the Hungarian uprising. In the same year, European colonial oppression also suffered a serious setback with the Suez Canal crisis, when international public pressure forced Britain and France to withdraw their forces from Egypt. Such international pressure failed to dissuade the Soviet Union from a violent clampdown against the Hungarian uprising or to end its occupation. The failure of the uprising and the democratic and national ideals it pronounced have formed a prominent role in national memory, and for many years, Hungarian hostility to Russia was a core feature of the political scene. In a strange twist of history, Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán became known as a strong ally of Putin and Russia, so much so that some observers feel it became a virtual client state.
The former Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán did not follow other politicians of the region who worked hard to make their countries independent from Russian energy. Instead, he did a lot to torpedo sanctions against Russia and actively sought to frustrate European financial and military support for Ukraine. This fully contradicts the ideals of the Hungarian uprising in 1956.
The election in Hungary in April 2026 and Orbán’s huge defeat and replacement by a moderate conservative Péter Magyar with a large majority in the parliament, who is keen to foster closer relations with the EU and distance it from Russia. Orbán’s defeat is predicted to have a serious impact on the fortunes of the global radical right. For years, the global radical right had tended to perceive the leadership of Viktor Orbán as a poster-boy for radical right movements, including Trump’s MAGA (Make America Great Again!) movement, where lead figures such as Vance, Rubio, and Trump himself publicly feted Orbán. With probably the most important mid-term elections in US postwar history being staged in November, many progressives hope the election result could be a turning point and omen for what might happen in America. Orbán’s defeat demonstrates that authoritarianism can be defeated. Can liberal democracy be rekindled and revived in Hungary and beyond? Before reflecting on this question, it is important to recount the events of 1956, as Russia’s relationship with Hungary was an important factor, some would claim in Orbán’s defeat.
The uprising began on the 23rd October 1956 in Budapest when university students appealed to the civil populace to join them at the Parliament to protest against the USSR’s iron grip on Hungary. Dissatisfaction with the USSR had been intense for some time. Hungary was liberated from Nazi Germany in 1945 by Soviet troops, but the liberation was seen as a humiliation by those Hungarians who had supported the alliance with the Axis powers, and the brutality of the Soviet troops did little to engender the support of the wider populace. Progressives also felt ill at ease given the USSR’s propensity toward totalitarianism. Initially, Hungary was governed by a coalition of parties, of which the Hungarian Communist Party was just one component. However, the Hungarian Communist leader Mátyás Rákosi, through a process of guile and stealth in what is referred to as “salami cutting tactics”; gradually eroded political freedom and plurality until he was able to establish in 1949 the Hungarian People’s Republic, which basically made Hungary a one-party communist state.
As Hungary was drawn more tightly into the Soviet Sphere, it was not spared the worst excesses of Stalinism as the country experienced the mass nationalisation of industry and was subject to purges and an aggressive clampdown against dissidents. Imre Nagy a reformist communist became prime minister in 1953 and attempted to counter and reverse the excesses of Rákosi’s Stalinism, but he was eventually forced out of the government in 1955, only to return as leader of a reform government formed as a result of the uprising, a key ambition of the government and uprising was to establish a democratic state autonomous of the USSR. The USSR, fearing the uprising could lead to the unravelling of its Empire launched a military invasion of Hungary, and on the 4th of November, Nagy was removed from office and later executed.
The failed Hungarian uprising became a mythical symbol of dissent for those opposed to Soviet authoritarianism in Central and Eastern Europe. It also led to the intensification of the Cold War, but also spawned the seed for reform. Realising that communism had limited ideological support in Hungary, communist leader János Kádár, although he had been a hardliner supporting the post-uprising clampdown, sought to forge a softer political system with what has been termed “goulash socialism’, allowing some economic and political liberalisation. A later leader of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, took this model as the inspiration for “perestroika” that sought to transform and rescue the soviet system through the establishment of new economic and political freedoms.
The liberalisation of perestroika led to Germans in the GDR (Communist East Germany) seeking to flee to the West by travelling via Hungary across the Austrian border. Hardline communists like Nicolae Ceaușescu of Romania appealed to Russia and Hungary to block this flow of refugees. Gorbachev refused to countenance a violent reaction as did the then-Hungarian government led by Miklós Németh, which refused to acquiesce to such demands, allowing thousands of East Germans to escape to the West. This was the catalyst for the unravelling and collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, most visibly symbolised by the fall of the Berlin Wall. In this process, Russia and Hungary’s shared reticence to resort to violence was a history-changing moment and a rare act of moral alignment and tacit cooperation that is sadly neglected in the history books.
Post communist Hungary in the 1990s was greatly influenced by the memory of 1956, with a range of Hungarian leaders, including Orbán, pledging to create a liberal democracy to honour the ideals of the uprising. The memory of the Soviet clampdown and a fear of being drawn again into the Russian sphere of influence were key factors that led to Hungary joining NATO in 1999 and joining the European Union in 2004, major political moments in the development of Hungary, which a then liberal and mainstream Orbán worked actively for in his first tenure as Prime Minister (1998 to 2002).
The transition dreams of democracy in Russia were short-lived; shock therapy and the cronyism of Yeltsin prepared the way for his protege, Putin, leading to the creation of a gangster state based on illegality, militant nationalism and territorial expansionism with no regard for the rule of law. Similar trends, but at a much slower pace, were to unfold in Hungary with Orbán’s transition into an authoritarian populist leader with his second premiership starting in 2010, being marked by intense cronyism, corruption and erosion of the rule of law. Hungary, up until Orbán’s defeat, was considered to be a hybrid democracy, and its transgressions in the sphere of the rule of law led to growing reprimand and sanction from the EU. Invoking the spirit of 1956, Péter Magyar, when leader of the opposition, at a memorial to the uprising, proclaimed “1956 revolution – 2026 regime change”, the spirit of 56 is clearly part of Magyar’s thinking in the democratic reconstruction of Hungary.
Despite Hungary’s troubled relationship with Russia, it was ironic that Orbán’s government, between 2010 and 2026, nurtured ever closer relations with Putin, going against the grain of other Western European leaders who have become increasingly perturbed by Putin’s disdain for the rule of law at home and abroad. Given Orbán’s militancy against Soviet occupation and idealisation of 1956, and the popular anger the clampdown arouses it was indeed surprising to see Orbán actively court the favour of Putin. This bromance was in part influenced by Hungary’s self-sustained dependency on Russian energy, but also ideological alignment on the need for authoritarian leadership at the expense of the rule of law. Hence, Orbán was assiduous in trying to protect Russia’s interests by blocking EU aid and support to Ukraine, with Hungary’s former Foreign Minister Peter Szijjártó actively feeding his Russian counterpart with confidential information from EU summits and working at the behest of Russia to further its interests. Such was the exasperation of the EU that there was growing talk about the need to expel Hungary from the EU. Few in 1956 would have predicted such a scenario or in their wildest dreams, imagined Hungary being a key supporter for Russian aggression. A key objective of the new prime minister, Péter Magyar, will be to turn a new page and look to the West rather than the East.
The relationship between Russia and Hungary was a central point of debate in the Hungarian election. One of the factors that helped Orbán win in 2022 was a promise to keep Hungary out of the war in Ukraine, and in 2026, this was endlessly repeated alongside demonising the Ukrainian leader Zelensky. This may, though, have had a negative impact in 2026 and backfired on Orbán.Sections of the public were ashamed of theOrbán regime’s links with Russia and bullying of a neighbour at war and weakened. Orbán’s orchestrated hysteria repulsed many. The extent of Hungary’s clientelist relationship with Putin was confirmed by a tape recording of Szijjártó’s deferential fawning to Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, and reports of the Russians sending intelligence operatives to Hungary to help destabilise the opposition through covert espionage and misinformation further inflamed public opinion against Orbán.
Orbán lost the election, in the opinion of some in part because of Hungary’s close relationship with Putin. If he had won, Hungary would have increasingly found itself cast as a client state of Russia. However, Hungary, under its new leaders, will need to look to the spirit of 1956 in the democratic rebuilding of Hungary. Also in the spirit of 1956, a new democratic Hungary, as with the great majority of EU member states, must support Ukraine’s accession into the EU. And rising above historical grievances, Hungarians should also reach out to their Russian counterparts with a message to the Russian people, inviting them to join in resisting authoritarianism instead of waging a war of aggression. That invitation can only have meaning if the EU makes a pledge to the Russian people that if they renounce authoritarianism and respect the rule of law like Hungarians, then they should be allowed to enjoy the fruits of Europe in a closer economic and cultural partnership, moving away from the tensions that have plagued and divided Europe and the world since 1945.
