Britain and the EU – what next?

EU

Andy Burnham has kicked off a debate about what to do about Britain’s relationship with the EU. He has said that we need an honest debate on the options facing Britain, now that Brexit is widely seen to have been a costly failure.

So, what ARE the options?

The Prime Minister mentioned four potential options. What are they – and what would they deliver?

  1. The status quo

This is costly. According to the Bank of England and the National Bureau of Economic Research, the size of the British economy (GDP) is between 6 and 8 per cent lower than it would otherwise have been. This has led, among other things, to a shortfall of government tax revenue of up to £90 billion per year (imagine the difference that would have made to current debates about how to finance much-needed policies!). Some 20,000 small businesses have stopped exporting to the EU entirely, and thousands have folded.

Add to that the non-economic issues, including Britain’s absence from the foreign policy and security discussions that take place in the EU, our weakened ability to control our own border due to lost cooperation frameworks, multiple practical complications faced by individuals who travel, diminished participation in joint research programmes, and much else.

Piecemeal improvements to the status quo, sector by sector, as initiated by the Starmer government, have proved to be painfully slow and problematic. The EU is wary of British “cherry picking”, and in any case solving the issues in one sector triggers consequences in other sectors. The package of measures being prepared for the summit on 20th November has taken well over two years to prepare, and the idea that an agri-food deal could be followed by others on, say, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and so on is very unlikely to be speedy.

  1. Customs union

Joining the EU’s Customs Union would secure modest economic benefits in terms of facilitating trade. It would avoid the need for customs checks (with their complex “rules of origin” checks) on goods, but it would not eliminate single market regulatory compliance checks. Britain would benefit from the tariff-lowering trade deals that the EU has negotiated with other countries around the world, but lose the ability to make separate deals of this kind – though in practice it has proved difficult to secure any better such deals when negotiating alone as the UK instead of as part  of the world’s largest market. Economic estimates are that a customs union alone would only recover a small fraction of total post-Brexit losses, of around 0.5% of GDP.

  1. Single market

Participating in the EU’s single market as a non-EU member (as Norway, Iceland and Switzerland do in various ways) would produce significant economic benefits, with British producers able to sell throughout the EU without further ado (no extra certification requirements, safety checks, authorisations, etc). This is because the single market has common rules on product standards, consumer protection, workers’ rights, environmental standards, and competition rules to avoid market domination by big multinational companies. Following these rules might not be a major problem in the short run (as most of them were developed when Britain was a member, and anyway, they are mostly good rules for taming and correcting markets), but over time, as the EU updates and modifies its regulations, Britain would have to apply those changes without having (much of) a say. It would become a “rule-taker” on these matters.  To a degree, it is already, as British firms which export to the EU follow many of those rules. But in the long run, it’s hard to imagine, for example, that Britain would accept that financial sector rules affecting the City of London could be adopted without Britain’s involvement.

  1. Full membership of the EU

This would deliver the economic benefits of the single market and the customs union combined, but, crucially, with a seat at the table where decisions are taken, and EU rules are set. British ministers would take part in meetings of the EU Council (protecting national interests as seen by the government of the day), and we would again have elected Members of the European Parliament (representing the full range of views of British public opinion).

Membership would also have non-economic benefits, in the multiple fields in which European countries cooperate through the EU framework, from research, to student exchanges, to fighting cross-border crime, cross-border transport, and much else.  What has become particularly important since we left the EU, is cooperation in the field of foreign policy and security. With a militarily aggressive Russia to the east and an unreliable and unpredictable USA to the west, we are discovering that we share interests, and indeed values, with our neighbouring countries in Europe. Regaining our seat at the table where European cooperation is discussed day-in and day-out, rather than negotiating belatedly from outside, would clearly be advantageous.

It is therefore likely that the debate launched by Andy Burnham on the options of what to do about the failure of Brexit will lead to a majority view that EU membership is in our best interests. Public opinion has already been shifting slowly but very steadily – one might say relentlessly – in that direction.

But such a conclusion raises questions about its feasibility. Already, the dwindling number of Brexit fans are pointing to alleged constraints, obstacles and problems. It is telling that they are focussing on this, rather than extolling the supposed benefits of Brexit, which are hard to find.

So, what are the alleged obstacles and difficulties, and do they stack up?

The claim that the EU would not actually want us back

Unfounded – and several leaders of EU countries from across the political spectrum have been saying so very clearly.

Think about it: if the one member state ever to have left the EU comes back a few years later saying leaving was a dreadful mistake, it would vindicate the existence and raison d’etre of the EU.

Brexit has damaged the EU too, economically and geo-strategically, albeit not as much as it damaged Britain, and the opportunity to rectify that would be welcomed and (far more readily than in the complicated, piecemeal and partial approach taken by Britain so far) and would see them take a positive position in the negotiations.

That it would take decades of efforts

No. Britain, as a former Member State, is still aligned with most EU rules. Where it has diverged is known and well documented, so negotiations can quickly focus on those points.

It is worth recalling that when Finland applied to join, negotiations took just two years, as it was similarly already aligned with much EU legislation through the EEA. With sufficient political will, Britain could similarly join in a short time frame, even if beating the Finnish record might be a challenge.

That the UK would have to join Schengen

No. Ireland is not in the Schengen passport-free travel area. Britain and Ireland stayed outside for objective reasons: both are islands with limited points of entry, where it makes sense to check identities at the limited points of entry, given that, in both cases, subsequent checks are much more difficult as neither has an internal system of identity cards and official residences – very different from continental countries where land borders can easily be crossed through fields and forests, but subsequent checks are easier. These objective reasons were accepted by the EU when Schengen was established and are still accepted, as Ireland illustrates.

That Britain would have to join the euro  

To join the euro, the EU has a number of formal conditions (for example, on the debt-to-GDP ratio, and on the stability of the exchange rate) that the UK does not meet – and could not for many years. There is also an informal condition: that the country in question actually wants to join. There are now 6 EU member states that are not in the euro, and 5 of them show no intention of joining. Sweden even had a referendum and decided not to. This situation has been accepted by the EU without fuss. No country has ever joined the euro against its will.

That Britain’s budgetary contribution to the EU would be excessive and there would be no rebate

Britain’s budgetary contribution – even if you take the grossly inflated and exaggerated figures used by the Brexiters – was much smaller than the economic benefits of membership. The losses to the UK economy arising from Brexit are between 5 and 8 per cent of GDP. Britain’s net contribution to the common EU budget was less than half a per cent of GDP.

As to the rebate that Britain had for being a high net contributor to the budget, while it was originally unique to the UK when first established, the EU now has rebates for all countries whose net contribution was seen as unduly high – now no fewer than five Member States (Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Austria and Sweden). Rebates are now established practice.

But in any case, the EU budget is increasingly on items where spending at the EU level saves money at the national level by avoiding duplication or through economies of scale. That benefits everybody.

That the EU’s freedom of movement will increase migration.

Most migration to Britain is from outside the EU and is therefore almost entirely a matter for national, not EU, rules. Britain can be as open or as restrictive as it likes. To the extent that this is affected by EU rules, it is on two useful aspects that we have lost with Brexit: access to shared police databases on criminal records, wanted suspects, fingerprints, etc that enabled real-time checks on those seeking to enter the UK, and the right under the EU’s “Dublin” regulations to return asylum seekers to the first EU country they entered to be evaluated there. It is no coincidence that the small boat phenomenon arose after we left the EU.

Migration to Britain from inside the EU is numerically much smaller and is less problematic. The EU’s internal Freedom of Movement is conditional on finding employment or proving self-sufficiency – much more acceptable to those who have concerns about migration.

In any case, due to the increased standard of living in countries like Poland, far fewer are likely to come to the UK. When they do, EU citizens are anyway more likely to return after a few years, less likely to bring families with them, and are overall net contributors to the exchequer (paying far more in tax than they take in benefits). If in future, poorer countries like Ukraine or Albania join, there will no doubt be the option of imposing transitional limits on the numbers allowed to move to other EU countries (an option that applied when Poland and others joined, but which Britain at that time chose not to invoke, a choice it would presumably not repeat).

And let us not forget that the EU’s internal Freedom of Movement is a reciprocal right, and over a million Brits worked, studied or retired in other EU countries, something that is now much more difficult and is missed by many.

That EU rules prevent public ownership of industries

Rubbish. Article 345 of the Treaty says very clearly: “The Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership”.  And just look at the publicly owned railways, water companies and so on in countries across the EU.

That the EU is being taken over by the far-right

As in Britain, far-right parties have made gains in several EU countries. They have also been voted out of office again in, for example, Hungary and Poland. They are unlikely ever to lead governments in a majority of member states. Fears that the AFD might take over Germany are greatly exaggerated: with Germany’s proportional voting system and the reluctance of any other party to work with the AFD, they would need over half of the vote nationally to do so, which is an extremely unlikely prospect. As to France, it is by no means certain that Le Pen will win the next presidential election, and if she does, that she would be in a position to be as radical as feared (look at Meloni in Italy). This is a risk – here and abroad – but not yet likely.

That it would be undemocratic to revisit the decision taken by the people

Significant numbers of Leave voters have changed their mind after seeing the reality of what Brexit has done to our country. As leading Brexiteer David Davis said: “If a democracy cannot change its mind, it ceases to be a democracy”.

Besides, no one born this century voted on Brexit. The younger generations are overwhelmingly more favourable to EU membership. It’s their future that is at stake!

That it revives a divisive issue

Brexit has remained a divisive issue because it bears no resemblance to the promises that were made, is costing a fortune, and continues to cause multiple problems.

Not addressing this would make it more difficult to address other issues, such as financing adult social care, infrastructure and housing, where failure would cause bigger divisions.

So, the debate is open. Rejoining is in Britain’s best interest, and the potential obstacles are not as great as some would have us believe. It’s a debate that can and must be won!

Would a referendum on the terms of accession be necessary? Legally, no, but politically, yes. Both for internal reasons – to copper-bottom the decision to rejoin through public endorsement so that it cannot willy-nilly be undone by any possible future Conservative or Reform government without going back to the public again – and to reassure the EU that readmitting Britain does not entail the risk of a subsequent government, elected (under our current electoral system) on a minority of the vote but with a majority of seats, inflicting the Brexit saga on them (and us) again!

A commitment in Labour’s next manifesto to negotiate terms for regaining our EU membership, followed by an application soon after the election, would leave time to negotiate a deal and hold a referendum on it, within the next Parliament.

Let’s not put this in the “too difficult” box – it really isn’t!

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