John Denham examines the flag phenomenon, why Labour is getting its response to England dangerously wrong and why it should develop a programme of genuine national and local democracy
After the “summer of flags”, Labour needs a long-overdue conversation about England. Many won’t want to, coming from a left that disparages patriotism while being blissfully unaware that 90% of England does not agree. Some on the left disguise their distaste for working-class England with a rejection of all things English. But Englishness, Britishness and the flags will not disappear from the national conversation. If we want to be relevant, we must take part.
First, the flags. Without doubt, their appearance stemmed from the conflict over asylum hotels. It seems unlikely that the movement stemmed only from far-right activists, but the flag flyers were clearly asserting a claim of belonging that they didn’t extend to those on small boats. But there was a paradox in the message. Real fears were felt by some from minority communities, but most from all backgrounds were quick to say “ those are our flags: they belong to all of us”. In the 1970s, the National Front were allowed to “ own” the union flag: it must not happen again. Better to see the flags as symbols of contested views of the nation in a contest that the majority must win.
Second, it’s wrong to think of Englishness or Britishness as representing two distinct identities. Those who are most strongly English are almost always strongly and patriotically British, while there is also a Britishness that has little to do with Englishness. When we talk about the English, we are really talking about people who combine “Englishness with Britishness”. Those who emphasise their Britishness are more often “ British without Englishness”. Not only is there more than one expression of Britishness in England, to make it more complicated Britishness is not even a unifying identity across Britain. Many in Wales, Scotland and England give a higher priority to their nation’s identity.
These identities are not just about flags and football. They reflect deeply political ideas of the nation. Those who identify most strongly as English were much more likely to vote Leave than those who emphasised British identity alone. The “ English with Britishness” have the strongest sense of national sovereignty: whether as the UK as a whole or, within the UK, as England. They want a unitary Westminster Parliament or an English Parliament, but not the current devolution settlement, which allows nationhood to Wales and Scotland but not to England. Most voters in England want English Laws made by English MPs, but it’s those who emphasise their English identity – the “English with Britishness” – who demand it most strongly. They are not opposed to English devolution but, unlike those who emphasise their Britishness, they don’t see it as an alternative to a strong central state.
Third, different national identities also reflect values, education, age, geography and race. The English with Britishness are more likely to be socially conservative and have the greatest concerns about immigration. They are somewhat older and less likely to have been to university. These English make up a larger part of the population in those parts of industrial and coastal England that have seen the most economic decline. They are less likely to think that politicians understand them or represent them or to feel they have agency in their own lives.
Contrary to myth, Englishness does not exclude ethnic minorities. Around a third already identify as English, and another third believe Englishness is open to them. Only a small minority of England’s population – around 10% – believe that you must be white to be English or British. (The continuing ethnic disparity is partly because multiculturalism originally posed a choice between an inclusive Britishness and an exclusive Englishness. In Scotland and Wales, the focus was always on inclusive national identities.)
The contested nation that flies behind the flags cannot be reduced to caricatures of “bad racist Englishness” and “good inclusive Britishness”. It centres on crucial, politically charged questions: What nation are we talking about? Who belongs to the nation? Where does its sovereignty lie? What do we mean by national democracy? In whose interests is the nation run? Who represents me, my class, my community? Generations of socialists would recognise those questions. If the left spurns Englishness, it is turning against millions of people and thousands of places it should want to represent.
This contested nationhood emerged, as always, from history and capitalism. In the imperial past, England needed little self-definition. It was the dominant part of the two unions (with Scotland and Ireland) at the heart of the greatest ever empire. Cultural Englishness would sometimes find a voice – think Vaughan Williams – but there was little need to distinguish England from Britain, and the nation only rarely needed a political expression. ( “ Little Englanders” was one which, contrary to current usage, opposed working-class youth being sent to fight colonial wars for the enrichment of others).
The empire acted as a glue around which a shared British identity could be expressed both by the British business class and the British Labour movement. Wales and Scotland enjoyed some cultural and institutional autonomy while sharing in the imperial benefits. The English dominated an Anglo-centric constitutionalism underpinned by a unitary state, which accorded all power and accountability to Westminster.
A declining empire eroded those common British bonds. In the 1960s, Welsh and Scottish nationalists gained Westminster seats, and the unresolved post-colonial tensions of Northern Ireland exploded. The political pressures that were released ultimately led to New Labour’s devolution settlement for Wales and Scotland and, via a different route, to the Northern Ireland Agreement. The powers devolved to the nations and Northern Ireland were far more extensive than in European nations, often thought to be less centralised than the UK.
Despite this huge upheaval in UK governance, in the former imperial capital, almost nothing changed. The doctrine of Anglo-centric constitutionalism was unchallenged, but it was now only England that was governed by the UK Government in Westminster. From being the strongest player in a UK-wide state, England alone now had no government of its own. It’s true that England is large enough to dominate most UK governments, but the political culture marginalises England as a nation: Labour, Liberal Democrats and Conservatives all continue to talk of “ Britain” when they are talking about England. England and Englishness were seen only on the sports field and on St George’s Day.
England is the only part of the UK to not have had a national debate or referendum about its system of governance. England has no machinery of government. It does not make its own laws, it has no national budget, and nowhere in Whitehall at political or civil service level are there even attempts to coordinate and implement policy across England. Government remains a mishmash of England-only, England and Wales and UK-wide departments and ministers, a fragmented structure that prevents joined-up working, obstructs devolution and allows the malign influence of the Treasury to dominate. The poor state of England’s public realm and services is the result.
The doctrine of Westminster centralisation has also overseen the hollowing out of England’s once extensive local democratic state. Local authorities have lost their financial autonomy and policy discretion, been forced to privatise services or pass them to quangos that are ineffectively accountable to ministers.
As England’s national democracy was denied and local democracy undermined, the
Neoliberal restructuring of the economy shattered mining, industrial and coastal areas. This went deeper than economic loss. Working-class communities that had seen themselves as playing a vital part in fuelling, transporting and manufacturing the nation were no longer treated as important. While in Wales and Scotland this fostered demands for devolution or independence, in England, decline was associated with the EU, a feeling that grew with large-scale EU migration. In the predominantly white working-class communities living socially and geographically apart from more diverse England, the economy provided few opportunities to develop a unified working-class response to economic change. Migration was seen to intensify political, economic and cultural competition. Brexit – decided on the twin issues of sovereignty and migration control – was the response of an emerging political Englishness.
The political English wants greater democracy and economic sovereignty. They want their voices to be heard and an economy that works in their interests, demands that the left can embrace. Though socially conservative and wanting controlled immigration, these voters have become steadily more liberal on gender, sexual orientation, and migration throughout the 21st century, and minds will change faster if the left is willing to engage on their other issues of concern.
The fight for the future of England is one in which some instincts of political Englishness pull towards the right and populism, and others to a more democratic and more egalitarian future. The left should engage in that fight. There is no contradiction between representing the progressive aspirations of English voters and the development of a more widely democratic and inclusive nation. We should be as comfortable recognising how white working-class voters have become excluded as we are in recognising the racism and class disadvantage faced by minorities. The main demand of political Englishness is to be heard, not to silence others. If the left does not respond, the space will be taken by populist politics that set white working-class communities against minorities.
It should be obvious that Labour’s current attempts to woo these voters by mimicking Reform UK messages are the opposite of what is needed. Labour is ignoring the progressive potential of political Englishness while reaffirming its most reactionary elements. It will prove disastrous. Labour should talk about England, and the people of England, and not just about Britain. It should bring together its current policies on working-class education, neighbourhood renewal and industrial strategy as an explicit response to the hopes of working-class England. It should grasp the dysfunctional nature of England’s governance and develop a programme of genuine national and local democracy, the reform of England’s national governance and the creation of an active state capable of delivering an economy for the common good.