In the wake of Trump’s Venezuela attack Juan Gabriel Tokatlian sketches the history of US claims and actions to take over “our hemisphere”
In the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS 2025), the resurrection of the Monroe Doctrine was announced, albeit with an addition: the “Trump Corollary.” In the past, there was a moment when another Corollary was added to the Doctrine. In his 1904 State of the Union address, the U.S. president announced the birth of the Roosevelt Corollary. The government arrogated to itself the right to intervene in the internal affairs of Latin American countries. Years later, in March 1911, Theodore Roosevelt asserted—almost as if hinting at the preamble of the 1904 Corollary—in a speech at the University of Berkeley, “I Took Panama.” With this statement, Roosevelt was referring to actions encouraged by Washington to promote Panama’s secession from Colombia for the subsequent purpose of building the Panama Canal in that new country. It was the expansion phase of a power that aspired to be hegemonic in the region.
In November 2025, the Trump Administration released the new NSS; on January 3, after 35 prior attacks on boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific that resulted in the extrajudicial execution of 115 people, Trump ordered the bombing of Venezuela—killing, in addition, 80 people–and the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, even though Venezuela had neither threatened the government nor attacked U.S. citizens.
The Trump Corollary was set in motion, along with his dream from December 2023, when he said for the first time that he wanted back Venezuelan oil: “I Took Venezuela.” Confusion still exists regarding the military operation to capture him quite easily and effectively, incidentally, and regarding the course of political developments in Venezuela. It was a forceful removal of a President and not regime change because Vice President Delcy Rodriguez became the new interim President. Within that framework, Trump asserted that the United States would “run” the country’s future. Neither in the military action itself nor in matters concerning control of oil wealth were—or will—international law, principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and personal immunity of heads of state be considered by Washington. There is no longer any pretence of hegemony: persuasion and soft power are, finally (and openly), part of the past.
What interests me on this occasion is to underscore the U.S. obsession with the idea that it somehow has a “right to own” the continent. An analysis of the different national security strategies is highly revealing. The NSS 2025 mentions “our hemisphere” (Latin America, the Caribbean islands, and Canada) six times in its five pages devoted to the region as if the whole continent were an area of exclusive command by Washington. Even more so now, given China’s economic and diplomatic projection in Latin America, in particular.
The first NSS was published in 1987: the hemisphere occupied one page. The 1988 NSS covered it in a page and a half. The 1990 NSS allotted half a page to it. The 1991 NSS spoke of a New International Order and, in one page devoted to the continent, referred with unquestionable emphasis to “our own hemisphere.” The 1993 NSS devoted no page at all to the region.
In the 1994 and 1995 NSSs, it was stated that the United States was willing to work with countries in the region. In the 1996 NSS, the term “our hemisphere” was used plainly. In the 1997 NSS, the expression “our hemisphere” appeared twice. In the 1998 NSS, it was used three times. In the 2000 NSS, “our hemisphere” was invoked four times.
In the 2002 NSS—post–9/11—there were no references; however, in the 2006 NSS, the notion of “our own hemisphere” was revived. In the 2010 NSS, the hemisphere was mentioned once. In the 2012 NSS, it was given half a page and highlighted “our own hemisphere” twice. The 2017 NSS—Trump I—devoted one page to the hemisphere and to the main challenges originating in the region: China’s power projection, illicit drugs, and migration. The 2022 NSS covered the hemisphere in two pages and revived an idea that, with varying emphasis, has been repeated since the first strategy in 1987: “the Western Hemisphere impacts the United States more directly than any other region.”
In sum, the NSS 2025 reclaims and reinforces a precept—sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit—that has historically traversed Democratic and Republican administrations alike: that the Western Hemisphere must always be under U.S. ascendancy, even as the world and the region have changed. At certain moments, with the aim of restoring a weakened hegemony; at others, with the purpose of imposing domination. Trump II leans toward the latter, with more sticks than carrots, without appealing to democratic values or legal principles. Without even guaranteeing resources, aid or technology.
For this reason, it is worth recalling the Memorandum on Latin America written in 1950—after a tour of the region—by the renowned George Kennan, the father of the containment strategy. The message that US officials were to convey to governments in the area was unequivocal: “we are more concerned with being respected than to be liked or understood.” Surely Trump and key figures in his circle agree with that message. Secretary of State Marco Rubio never tires of reminding us of that dictum.
The illegal military attack on Venezuela is perhaps the clearest example in the 21st century—one should not forget that in 1989 the United States invaded Panama and kidnapped the dictator Manuel Antonio Noriega—of recurrent interventionism. It is crucially important to recognize that Venezuela has been the first South American country lethally assaulted in the history of the inter-American relations. Now, in a larger global geopolitical context. However, US apparent victory may become a pyrrhic triumph. Trump’s impulses towards domination may end up being a sham.